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I.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Study
The focus of this paper is United States-Japan bilateral trade and
trade policy in steel products during 1975-80.

These were years

of worldwide recession and excess capacity in steel, an increase

. in the import share in the U.S. market, and the American imposition, suspension and reinstatement of a trigger price mechanism which
set a de facto floor price on steel.

During this period, notably in 1977,

steel trade became highly politicized.

There are six main actors: the American steel industry; the Japanese
steel industry; the American government; the Japanase government; the
European Economic Community (EEC) steel industry; and the EEC governmental
organizations, national and supranational.
of course.

No single actor is homogeneous,

It is a story without beginning or end.

The antecedents lie

• in the quite different histories of the steel industries in the United
States, Japan, and Western Europe since World War II.

The American

industry modernized somewhat without expanding capacity greatly, the
European industry expanded capacity considerably and modernized somewhat,
and Japan built a very large, modern industry comparable in size
to the United States.

In the process comparative advantage moved away

. *The authors are respectively Professor of Economics and Associate
Professor of Political Science at Yale University. We express our ap
preciation to Tae-dong Kim for research assistance, to those many Japanese
and American policymakers and specialists whom we have interviewed and
whose anonymity we respect, and to the Luce Foundation for financial
support.
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from the United States to Japan.

1

This process continues.

The bit

actors--with larger future roles--are the industries in Canada,
Australia, and particularly a number of developing countries where

labor costs are low and industrialization well under way.
The ongoing, intertwined theme is how the American steel industry
has responded to substantially enhanced competition in the American
.market and how Japanese steel producers have entered the American market.
One important response by the American industry has been to seek pro
tection by restriction of imports.

Many of the issues revolve around

determination of "fairness" and "unfairness" in the context of free
trade.

The American industry has been successful in obtaining protection

because it is large, politically well organized and powerful, and
generally considered an important basic industry.

At the same time it

is constrained by the fact that major users of steel are also politically
powerful and want prices kept competitive, especially as their products,
such as automobiles> face increasing competition both in world markets

.-

and at home •

1

In the last five years there have been a number of government,
industry, security analyst, and academic studies of the changing competitive
position of the American steel industry vis a vis Japan and Europe, and to
a lesser degree the other steel producing nations. See Federal Trade.Com
mission (FTC 1977), Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS, 1977),
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, 1980), Government Accounting Office
(GAO, 1981), American Iron and Steel.Institute. (AISI, 1980 ), the Putnam,
~yes an4 Bartlett studies (1977 and 1978) for AlSI, Marcus and Kirsis
(We>tld Steel Dyrtamics, 1979),. reports_ by. Charles Bradford of Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Smith (Stee1·1ndustry Quarterly Review, various issues),
the numerous studies by Kawahito and Mueller (see references cited), and
Crandall (1980a, 1980b) as well as his forthcoming Brookings Institution
study.
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Import restriction s harm users by raising prices and by increasing
the rate of inflation (important since steel input cost increases are
often passed on by users).

In the longer run it reduces the competitive

stimulus for the steel industry (management and labor) to get costs in
It results in socially inefficient allocations of capital and

line.
labor.

And particularl y in the case of steel, import restriction s in

_vite retaliation .

The benefits of import restriction s accrue to workers

in the steel industry through more steel jobs and higher wages than
otherwise, to management in higher salaries, and to stockholder s in
higher profits.

If such a redistribut ion is desired, import restriction

is a particularl y clumsy and inefficient way of achieving it.

Much of the recent story involves the trigger price mechanism (TPM),
which was an American political solution to some of the economic problems
confronting it~ steel industry.

In the remainder of this section we

outline American antidumping legislation and administrat ion, and the

import control system of the late 1960s and early 1~70s.

We then discuss

the evolving structure and competitive ness of the American and Japanese
steel industries in a world context.

The two. following sections consider

the political and economic circumstanc es which led to the creation of the
TPM, and provides a brief description of it.

Its suspension and rein

statement in 1980 are treated in Section V.

Section VI provides a brief

evaluation of the TPM.

In the final section we speculate upon future

prospects for U.S.-Japan steel trade and trade policy.

I

I.
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The Antidumping Law
One of the tasks of trade policy has been to define "unfair" com
petitive practices such as predatory pricing, dumping, and export sub
sidization, to establish criteria for determining their occurrence, and
to provide mechanisms (such as antidumping or countervailing import
duties) to offset demonstrable injury to domestic producers of import
competing products.

In steel the main trade issue in recent years has

revolved around American industry allegations of foreign dumping in the
U.S. market.

Tt.10 criteria are basic in an antidumping case: imports

must have been sold at "less than fair value" (dumped); and this dumping
must cause material :7.njury to domestic producers.
The U.S. Antidumping Act of 1921 defined three alternative measures
of less than fair value, in descending order of application.

First was

comparison between prices in the exporting nation and export prices;
export prices less than home prices are unfair.

Second, if there were

insufficient home-market sales, comparison is made with prices of exports
to third-country markets.

Third, if'neither set of price comparisons

could be made, export prices were compared with a "constructed value"
based on costs of production including overhead (fixed) costs of at least
10 percent of direct costs plus an 8 percent profit margin.
criterion was not frequently used because price data were

able.

This final
usually avail

Note the first criterion allowed marginal cost pricing abroad if

also done at home.
The 1974 Trade Act fundamentally altered the use of these criteria,
substantially increasing the degree of import protection for industries
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subject to strong cyclical recession s or persisten t excess capacity.

Essential ly it has eliminate d the possibili ty of marginal cost pricing
for exports, substitut ing instead some measure of average cost of pro
duction from the compariso n wit_h export prices.

It made antidumpi ng

suits more attractiv e since the construct ed-value criterion for deter

mining less than fair value could be applied.

In recession s, producers

in industrie s with high fixed costs will sell at prices below average

costs because-s mall losses are preferabl e to large.

Now they run the

danger of antidumpi ng suits if they pursue this competiti ve pricing
behavior in exports to the United States.
This new definitio n of dumping places major emphasis upon cost of
productio n in recession s.

And, as the trigger price mechanism experienc e

indicates , costs are extremely difficult to measure.
ministrat ive nightmare (Crandall , 1980a).

It poses an ad

Unfortun ately, this definitio n

has spread to others; the European Economic Community adopted a similar
dumping code in December 1979.
Nonethele ss, antidumpi ng suits are not a panacea for import-co mpeting
firms and industrie s.

The informati on-gather ing and legal costs, time

lags in implemen tation, and uncertain ty as to final determina tion make
it expensive .

However, if dumping and injury are found

a prelimina ry

anti-dump ing duty is assessed, subject to a final determina tion of the
amount of the duty.

Imports that clear Customs after the prelimina ry

determina tion are subject to the duty at the (unknown) rate to be set

in the final determina tion.

As a consequen ce, imports of the affected
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product virtually cease from the affected exporter during the approxi
mately six-month period between prelimina ry and final determina tion, a

draconian solution.
Previous Import Control Efforts
Satisfied with the large, prosperou s domestic market, the U.S.
steel industry- -like many other .American industrie s-remain ed complacen t
about export markets for many years.

As others became stronger and the

competiti on grew, the industry was forced to struggle with smaller shares
of the home market.

Since 1959, when there was a major domestic steel

strike and imports exceeded exports in volume for the first time, the
2
share of imports in apparent domestic consumpti on steadily increased

from about 5 percent at the beginning of the 1960s to 17 percent in
1968.

As

imports increased , so did domestic protectio nist efforts and

governmen t receptivi ty thereto.

Until the late 1960s, the governmen t

-had maintaine d a rather antagoni stic position toward the domestic in
dustry, underscor ed by the confronta tion in 1962 between President
Kennedy and Roger M. Blough, then chairman of US Steel, over prices.
The situation was considera bly different in 1967-68.
In 1967 steel mounted a major anti-impo rt compaign, focusing
largely on lobbying Congress to pressure the Executive .

This led to

introduct ion of an omnibus bill providing for mandatory import quotas
on a number of products, including steel.

Regarding such legislati ve

moves as too protectio nist, the State Departmen t negotiate d with Japanese
and European steelmake rs a three-yea r voluntary export restraint (VRA).
The VRA went into effect January 1, 1969, ·and was extended in 1972 for
another three years.
2Apparent consumpt ion= apparent supply= productio n+ imports exports, i.e. inventory change is not taken into account.
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While American producers were more or less content with VRAs,

which limited imports and allowed them to raise domestic prices, consumer
groups in the United States were unhappy.

In October 1972 the Consumers

Union brought an antitrust suit against the State Department, the domestic
steel industry, and foreign steel producers, charging they violated the

Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain foreign commerce.

The Court of

Appeals upheld the State Department 's authority to negotiate the agree
ment and dismissed an expression by the District Court suggesting that

there was an.antitrus t

violation.

The antitrust issue had been with

drawn from the case by agreement of counsel because it would have re
quired protracted litigation.

Nonetheless , this case has led most

observers to believe that there are antitrust risks in a VRA which is
not entered into pursuant to foreign governmenta l direction or specific
U.S. legal authority.

The VRA was allowed to expire in 1975, partly

for this reason.
In July 1975, American specialty steel (alloy and stainless) producers
backed by the United Steelworker s of America (USW) filed a petition for
relief from imports under the escape clause provision (Section 201) of

the 1974 Trade Act.

In January 1976, the Internation al Trade Commission

(ITC) ruled in favor of the industry, recommending import quotas for a
five-year period on a product-by- product basis.

Upon receipt of this·

ITC recommenda tion, President Ford instructed his Special Trade Representa
tive, Frederick B. Dent, to negotiate intergovern mental voluntary restraint

agreements that did not risk antitrust violations, called "orderly marketing agreements" (OMAs), with principal exporting countries.

While Japan

was willing to accept an OMA, the EEC and Sweden refused, so Ford imposed
three-year quotas on specialty steel imports (Adams and Dirlam, 1979, pp. 98-101).
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Meanwhile, the Europeans had persuaded the six major Japanese pro
ducers voluntarily to limit shipments of general steel products to the
EEC.

The U.S. industry reacted itmnediately, by filing, in October

1976, a Section 301 complaint with the Office of the Special Trade
Representative (STR).

The 301 provision of the 1974 Trade Act is

specially intended to deal with foreign practices and policies adversely
affecting the U.S. economy, including distortiomof trade that result
from foreign government arrangements.

The suit charged the Japanese pro

ducers' restraint agreement unfairly diverted steel from Europe to the
United States.

Although the Ford Administration did not seriously act

on the suit and it was dismissed fourteen months later for lack of
sufficient evidence, the 301 c~se prepared the ground for a new round
of steel trade politics under the Carter Administration (Sato and Hodin,
1980, pp. 8-13).

II.

The American and Japanese Steel Industries in World Perspective
Steel of given specifications does uot differ from producer to producer.

However, steel refers to an enormous variety of specific steel products.
The American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) classifies 32 product
categories, and many products within each category.

Each product is

further distinguished by grade, size (width and length), other specified
qualities (such as coating, finish, tolerance, packaging), and other
special conditions which enter the price.

basic carbon steel.

In general, steel refers to

Stainless and alloy (specialty) steels are suf

ficiently different products, with specialized producers, to have had

a separate trade policy in the 1970s, as noted above.
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Most steel is produced in integrated mills where economies of scale
About 85 percent of

are significant , and optimal scale is very large.

steel in the United States is produced by integrated producers (OTA, 1980,

p. 10).

The proportion in Japan is comparable.

A limited range of

products-m ainly rods, angles and bars-are efficiently produced from
scrap in electrical furnaces

in_minimill s.

Such plants can be located

near markets.
Viewed in longer-run perspective the world steel industry since World
War II has go~e through a remarkable transformat ion--in technology, in

total capacity, in geographic location of production.

Demand in the

United States has not grown substantial ly since the mid-1950s, especially
relative to capacity.

Between 1955 and 1979 U.S. production increased by

11 percent, European, 108 percent, and Japanese, lOUO percent.

Over

this period world trade in steel grew, as did the role of all the
Western European nations and Japan; their respective shares of the 139
million tons exported (excluding intra-EEC trade) in 1979 were respectivel y
33 and 29 percent (OECD, 1980a).

The ste.el industry has reflected the

dynamics of evolving rnmp~r~tive advantage and countries have successfully pursued infant industry protection in steel.
the low-cost producer.

Japan has become

However, costs both of building efficient inte

grated mills and of operating them are now lower in developing countries
due to low wage rates even relative to productivit y (Crandall, 1980b,
p. 144).

The excess capacity in world steel since 1974 will continue

well into the 1980s.

The eventual major new integrated plants will

probably not be built in Western Europe, the United States, or Japan.
Detailed analyses of the cost, price, structure, technology

I

I
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and other characteristics of the industry are provided elsewhere (see
Footnote 1).

A brief summary follows.

Market Structures
Economies of scale mean the steel industry in any country is oli
gopolistic.

Competition across national boundaries is impeded by sub

stantial transport costs and various trade barriers.

The Japanese indus

try is most concentrated, the United States next, and the EEC less so.

US Steel, the largest American producer, has relatively old plants
specializing in carbon sheets (Crandall, 1980a, p. 19).

Much of the American

import problem is a US Steel problem: in 1955 its U.S. market share
was 31 percent, imports were negligible; by 1979 US Steel's share had
declined by 13 percentage points to 18 percent, and imports increased
to 15 percent (Bradford, February 1980, pp. 13-14).

Lynn (1980) and

Woolcock (1980) discuss the structure and problems of the American
industry.
The Japanese industry has ten integrated producers.

It is dominated

by the Big Six (Nippon Steel~ Nippon Kokan~ Kobe, Kawasaki~ Sumitomo, and
Nisshin).

Nippon Steel, the largest producer in the world, exercises

considerable leadership among the Big Six.
efficient producers.

They are all considered highly

Since late 1977 they have been regarded as the

world's most efficient, cost competitive, integrated steel producing
firms.

Certainly, however, some American and European mills are as

efficient as Japanese mills, and Japanese firms are not the minimum-cost
producers of all steel products.

For further detail see Kawahito's

various studies, Imai (1975), and Watanabe and Kinoshita (1970).
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The steel industry in the EEC is more heterogeneous and less
concentrated, not surprising since it consists of firms, some state
owned, in all the member countries.

There are national differences in

industry and government attitudes and policies, and in degree of com
petitiveness.

A number of_new, large modem-plants have been built at

deep-water sites, but many obsolete facilities have yet to be modernized
or scrapped.
More than fifty developing countries have some type of steel pro

duction, but only nineteen have integrated steelmaking capacity (Kawahito,
1980b, p. 68).

Since optimal scale for an integrated facility is now on

the order of 6 million tons annual capacity, not surprisingly developing
countries build electric furnances and fabrication facilities until
domestic market size makes an integrated plant economic.

Thus they import

some steel products and export others.

Pricing Behavior
Price and service (assured supplies, early delivery dates, technical

assistance) are the main means of competing.

American firms have had a

policy of friendly competition since 1910, when US Steel was established
(Adams, 1977, p. 88).

The industry engages in what the Federal Trade

Commission study (1977) terms "barometric price leadership."

In Japan,

Nippon Steel has been the main price leader since it was established
in 1970 by the merger of Yawata and Fuji.

Woolcock (1980, p. 5) des

cribes European pricing practices as imperfect collusion.
List prices are the starting point for the pricing of steel products.
They are changed infrequently, but are in practice only a reference point.

-12-

Actual market prices reflect short-ru n demand and supply conditio ns.
Price variabi lity is conside rably greater than price indexes suggest ;
compreh ensive data are difficu lt to obtain.
It appears that in recessio n U.S. produce rs are reluctan t to shift
far from adminis tered (average cost plus mark-up ) pricing strateg ies
toward margina l cost pricing .

Japanes e produce rs apparen tly are somewhat

more willing to do so, in both domesti c and export markets.

Thus Japanes e

(and Europea n) steel firm pricing practice is a substan tial constra int upon
the market power of the American i~dustry .

Kawahito has conside red Japanes e

domesti c pricing arrangem ents in various studies.

Technolo gy
Substan tial innovati on has taken place in steel product ion over
the past thirty years in both product and process technolo gies.
affected the nationa l industri es very differen tly.

This

Japan, with all its

capacity built since the 1950s, has been able to take advantag e of new
technol ogies.

Almost all current America n integrat ed steel capacity was

built prior to 1950.

The optimum size of integrat ed mills has increas ed,

but America n firms have had to bear higher costs introduc ing new tech
nologie s into existing , now relative ly small, plants.
It is estimate d at least one-fif th of American steel faciliti es
3
are obsolet e (OTA, 1980, p. 129).

- 3

It is too expensiv e

Father W. T. Hogan, a well-kno wn economi st speciali zing on the
steel industry , has suggeste d only 70-75 percent of U.S. capacity con
sists of good, modern equipme nt (speech before the Japan Society , New
York, November 29, 1979).
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and ineff;cient to modernize much--probably most--of this obsolete
capacity.

Europe has had a similar problem of the overhang of existing,
Thus, while the same ''best" technologies are embodied

outdated capacity.

in the efficient modern mills in Japan, the United States, and Europe,
on average the technological level is lower in the United States and

EEC.

The .Cff.A 1980 study stresses the United States does not lag ser

iously in product technologies but does in process technologies.
4
American management has also been conservative and slow.
Steel is often regarded as capital intensive.

In fact it is

in the middle range as measured by the proportion of gross value
added by labor, similar in the United States to bakery products and
costume jewelry.

By this measure it is substantiaily less capital

intensive than industrial inorganic chemicals or petroleum refining
(Crandall, 1978).

Costs of Production
Considerable research has been done in the United States over the
past five years concerning the comparative costs of production of the
American steel industry and its major competitors, since these estimates
provide the basis for evaluating allegations of dumping.
Federal Trade Commission and Council on Wage and Price Stability studies
of 1977 were of great importance in changing perceptions.

Japanese

firms were no longer seen simply as dumpers but as the most efficient,
4

Lynn has done an excellent study of the differential diffusion rate
of the blast oxygen furnace in replacing the open hearth in Japan and the
United States. By 1960 it was clear the BOF technology is superior: it costs
less both to build and to operate. Since then no new open hearth furnaces
have been built in Japan or the United States. BOF was developed in the
early 1950s; its superiority was not initially evident since there were
many technical problems and high pollution. However, during the crucial
introduction period 1954-60 Japanese firms selected the BOF process in
six of nine cases of investment, and American firms in four of twelve
lLvnn. 1980. o. 51).

-14low cost producers; the competitive difficulties of the American industry
came to be seen rather more as problems of controlling its own costs
and slowness in technological innovation and diffusion.

It was gen

erally concluded that even after transport costs Japanese average (and
presumably marginal) costs were below American costs in the American
market, though how much was unclear.
subsidized by the government.

Moreover, Japanese costs were not

Besides newer plants, Japan's relative

cost advantage has several other aspects.

The decline in ocean relative

to land transport costs means the United States and Germany no longer
pave the advantage of relatively cheap domestic raw materials (Crandall,
1980b).

Another reason is that American steel worker wages have risen

not only absolutely but·as a ratio to all manufacturing wages; it is now
5
Table 1 provides comparisons
considerably above the ratio in Japan.
of American and Japanese labor and raw material costs over time.
Capital costs are more difficult to compare.

Short-run marginal

'

costs are about two-thirds and fixed costs one-third of total average
costs at normal (90 percent) capacity utilization rates.

A major dif

ference in capital costs between the United States and Japan lies in the
financing structure of companies.

A comnon rule of thumb is that

respective debt/equity ratios are 40:60 and 80:20.

Accordingly Japanese

firms pay more interest and earn less profits per ton of steel.

It is

not clear that it makes a great deal of sense to compare average rates
of profit (return on equity) in the United States and Japan since the

variance among firms is substantial, particularly in the United States

5
The premium of steelworker wages over those in all manufacturing,
about 30 percent in 1970, had risen to 75 percent by 1980. This has
been in large part the consequence of the union contract since 1974 in
corporating the Experimental Negotiating Agreement, by which unions have
pledged not to strike in exchange for real wage increases including a
cost of living clause. If the United States had the 1978 Japanese ratio
of steelworker wages to all manufacturing of 32 percent, then hourly labor
costs in 1978 would have been $2.28 lower, and the cost/ton of steel lower
by $22.89. By 1980 the attendant per ton cost differential $30-$40 (GAO,
.
1981, p. 7-13).

-15(see OTA, 1980, p. 122).

It is a remark.able indication of Japanese

industry cost competitiveness that they have operated profitably in
the past three years at only 70 percent capacity utilization; in part
this is due to an upgrading of steel product mix.

Government Policy
Governments treat steel differently from most other industries.
Steel is regarded as a basic input for industrial activity.
is

Thus it

encouraged through both domestic and foreign trade policies.

30 percent of non-Communist world capacity is government-owned.

About

There

is no government ownership in the United States or Japan, but substantial
ownership in Europe except for West Germany.

Government ownership has

been linked to subsidy, especially in recessions.

At the same time steel

is an oligopolistic industry with considerable market power.
increases become inflationary signals.
generates much pollution.

Price

It is also an industry which

These lead to government.regulatory efforts.

Until the· early 1970s the Japanese industry was protected from
foreign competition from imports or direct investment in Japan.
Che Japanese government has been very supportive of the industry.

Overall,
United

States government policy toward the American steel has been more ambivalent,
reflective of the general ambivalence toward industrial policy.
industry blames its difficulties on the government.

The

At the same time

there is little evidence the industry has used the 1969-75 and 1978-80

periods of import restraint to accelerate its restructuring and modern
izing efforts.
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The World Steel Recession, 1975-80
The American, Japanese, and world, steel industry face two broad
problems: structural, and cyclical.

There are two interrelated struc

tural problems: the shift in comparative advantage from the United

States and Europe to Japan and some developing countries;
and the large world excess capacity that has emerged since 1975 as a
consequence of world recession and excessively optimistic expansion
programs begun in the mid-1960s by European,. and to a lesser extent,
Japanese firms.

Excess capacity is more than a cyclical problem,.

though the cyclical recession has exacerbated it.
Steel continues to be a troubled industry.

until world demand catches up with world supply.

Prospects are poor
The American industry

has a vested interest in forecasting future shortages in order to jus
tify government support now.
of more than
longer.

a temporary

The general view is that serious shortages

nature are unlikely within five years, probably

(See OECD, 1980b; a summary of various projections appears in

OTA, 1980, pp. 145-50.)

T"nis issue is cQnsidered further in the final

section.
Comparisons of American and Japanese Steel Industries: A Summary
Contrasts between the American and Japanese steel industries are
substantial.

The Japanese industry is modern, large-scale, efficient,

low cost; the American industry is a mixture of these characteristics and
substantial (20-25 percent) obsolete capacity.

The Japanese average

technological level is higher,. especially in process technology where
diffusion bas been more rapid.

Japanese wage rates are lower, absolutely

and relative to wages in all manufacturing.

Japanese capital costs are

-17-

lower. due mainly to its financial system which tolerates high debt/
equity ratios.

Many American firms are verticall y integrate d; the

industry relies mainly on domestic coal and iron ore.

Japanese firms

import all iron ore and coal; they have benefitte d from the developme nt
of new low-cost foreign sources of supply, often based on long-term
contracts with Japan, and sharply reduced relative costs of ocean
transport by giant carriers.

The Japanese industry is located at deep

water ports, minimizin g transport costs of imports and exports.

The

U.S. industry. is located mainly in the Midwest, near tradition al mar
kets but distant from growing South, Southwest and West Coast markets.

The Japanese industry be~efitte d from rapidly growing domestic
demand in the 1955-1973 period, making profitabl e ~he building of new,

large-sca le efficient mills.

Demand has not grown substant ially in the

United States, especiall y relative to existing capacity.

The Japanese

industry has long had a global strategy which took into account export
• opportun ities in planning P!oductio n and capacity expansion ; the American
industry has focussed on the U.S. market, with little attention to
possible export opportun ities.

Japan exports over 30 percent of its

productio n; the United States, less than 3 percent, and has been a net
importer since 1959.

The Japanese industry appears to have engaged

relativel y more in marginal cost pricing in recession s, in both domestic
markets and abroad.

6

It has benefitte d from a somewhat more favorable

government policy environme nt than the American industry.

6

.

Given the oligopol istic structure of steel industrie s, pricing
under such circumsta nces was below "normal" average cost but probably
not often so low as short-run marginal costs.
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The industries also have important similarities.
large, and have large domestic markets.

They are very

They both have high technological

capabilities, to do R&D and to implement innovation.

Both industries

are mature: neither is likely to add substantially to capacity, and any
additions are likely to be in expansion of existing facilities and
electric furnance minimills.

III.

7
Creation of the Trigger Price Mechanism
This section deals with the political-econo mic processes leading

to creation of the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) in the United States.
The TPM was a way to provide import relief to domestic industry while
avoiding a trade war and political confrontation with major steel ex
porting countries, particularly those in Europe.

Imports from Japan,

however, were the first target of the steel lobby in 1977.

The new

Carter Administration immediately came under strong pressure from the
domestic steel industry.

Both the companies and the steelworkers

uninn PmpngQizP~ 1imi~ing imports from Japan~ which were 37 percent higher
than in 1975. Vice President Mondale on his Tokyo visit in early February
expressed concern but stopped short of proposing any specific measures. Never/
1
tbeless.,. this was a sufficient signal for the Japanese steel industry.

On

February 5, Eishiro Saito, President of Nippon Steel, and seven

other exeX1:1tLves proposed to MITI Minister Tatsuo Tanaka that there
be µitergovemmen tal negotiations to reach an orderly marketing agree.
Unless otherwise noted, this section is a summary of Hideo Sato
and Michael W. Rodin, "The Politics of Trade: The U.S.-Japanese Steel
Issue of 1977," paper prepared for the Japan-United States Economic
Relations Group, October ~980.
• 7
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ment (OMA).

Indeed, the Japanese industry had been more or less will

ing to restrain exports ever since the issue first arose with the
United States in 1967.
Why is steel less resistant to export restraint ?

Four interrela ted

reasons are usually given by experts in Japan: (1) the interdepe ndent nature

of the industry, (2) its sense of indebtedn ess (on) to the United States for
earlier assistanc e, (3) profitab ility of quantitat ive export restraint ,
and (4) fear of losing a large and stable market share in the United
States.

Of course, relative emphasis given to these factors varies.

Nippon Steel Chairman Yoshihiro Inayama, known as .Mr. Cartel for his
strong belief in the importanc e of export restraint and orderly markets, singles out on

as most important .

Gilmore Files an Antidumpi ng Suit
While Japanese steelmake rs did not particula rly mind their American
counterpa rts calling for an intergove rnmental agreement to restrain their
exports to the United States, they abhorred another kind of action,

antidumpi ng suits.

Gilmore Steel, a small firm in Portland, Oregon, in

February 1977 filed an antidumpi ng suit against five major Japanese
steelmake rs, charging their selling carbon steel plate for $77 below the
average U.S. domestic price per ton was dumping.

Finding Gilmore's document a

tion in order, Treasury began an investiga tion on March 29.

Although

Gilmore was a small company, an affirmati ve determina tion could affect
all Japanese carbon steel plate exports to the United States.

Japanese

steelmake rs were also disturbed by what th~y regarded as a "peculiar "
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definition of dumping under the 1974 Trade Act.
forced either to stop exports altogether

They feared being

or to raise prices sufficiently

to avoid further allegations, thereby losing their competitive edge.

Meanwhile, the AISI and the steelworkers union were organizing
major nation-wide campaigns to enlist support.

Their strategy included

efforts to achieve quantitative import control (through an OMA or an
appeal under the 301 provision of the Trade Act) or limiting imports
through antidumping suits.
sectoral agreement

Their ultimate goal has been a multilateral

to regulate ~teel trade under GATT auspices along

the lines of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) on textiles.
The AISI commissioned a report (Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, 1977)
that charged foreign suppliers (including the Japanese) were practicing
discriminatory pricing between home and export shipments; that various
types of direct and indirect aid by national governments had led to
large-scale

capital expansion; and that pressures existed to export at

prices below full unit costs in order to help pay for this substantial
investment. Finding the AISI allegations fraught with factual errors and
misrepresentations, the Japanese industry prepared a formal rebuttal
(Japan Iron & Steel Exporters Association, 1977) which appeared in July.
In addition, because Japanese industry leaders interpreted the AISI
move as indicative of a serious intent by the U.S. industry to seek

import control, they renewed their call for intergovernmental negotia
tions to work out an OMA.

However, MITI preferred to wait until a

formal United States government request was received.
It soon became known that US Steel was preparing an antidumping
suit against all major Japanese steel imports. Because European steelmakers

-21-

were less efficient than Japanese and therefore more likely to have
dumped steel, one may wonder why the focus was on Japan.

It appears

Edgar B. Speer, US Steel's chairman, and others were effectively using
Japan as a scapegoat.

There was a growing climate of opinion critical

of Japan because of the enormous bilateral trade imbalance beginning in
And, in the context of America'sbroad er trade negotiations involv

1977.

ing Japan, an image of unfair Japanese trading practices had been
similarly emphasized in public speeches of political leaders and in
news reports.

The general lack of knowledge about Japan in the United

States and Japanese reticence to respond made such allegations sound
even more credible.
There was no consensus within the Carter Administration on how
to cope with the problem.

However, having just concluded an OMA with

Japan on color television imports, there was a reluctance to handle steel with
quantitative restrictions.
restrictions

The industry was an oligopoly and such

~n111n nn1y mP~n ~n

opportunity to raise prices.

On

the other hand, many in the executive branch who normally would have
opposed protection were reluctant to because of their greater concern for successful completion of the multilateral trade negotiations
(Ml'N).

They were willing to allow some assistance to steel in exchange

for steel's support for the MTN.

Eventually, those opposed to

quantitative import control as inflationary held sway.
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The first sign of confrontation between the governments of the
United States and Japan on steel surfaced in late July when the
Japanese steel industry refused to submit production cost data to the
Treasury for the Gilmore case investigation.

The Japanese agreed to

provide price data but refused to submit product-by-product cost data.

Industry leaders looked on the suit as a pretext to obtain production
secrets.

The Japanese government also opposed submission of such cost

data, and advised noncompliance.

The Japanese industry was in a dilemma. To clear themselves of the dump
ing charge Japanese firms felt they had to cooperate with Treasury. If they did

not, the .Americans could say the Japanese had admitted their ~ilt.
Moreover, without th~ cost data

Treasury would depend on less reliable

figures available in the United States, including data submitted by
Gilmore.
MITI officials were sandwiched between the Japanese industry, which
wanted voluntary export restraint through an OMA, and the United States

government, which opposed such approaches.

Under these circumstances,

Naohiro Amaya, MITI's Director of the Heavy Industries Bureau, visited
the United States in August.

It became clear from these talks that

the U.S. government was more inclined to support a price-oriented
approach.

Amaya reported on his trip to Inayama.

But Inayama refused

to believe him, saying the U.S •. government would definitely push for a

quantitative approach.
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The Raging "Firestorm" Against Imports

Still unable to obtain any government support for import restric
tions, U.S. industry and labor leaders escalated their anti-import
campaign.

This well-orchestrated effort coincided with some bad news

about the domestic industry.

Youngstown Sheet and Tube announced it

would severely cut back operations at Youngstown, Ohio, permanently

furloughing five thousand production workers.

Bethlehem and Armco

announced closings that eliminated eight thousand jobs.

Some of the

closings may have been announced intentionally to put pressure on the
government.
On September 19,, US Steel filed its antidumping suit against the

six largest Japanese steel companies, alleging they were "dumping
their excess steel products at distress prices" (allegedly 23 percent
. below costs).

Just the day before, Inayama had stated in a press

conference that the Japanese industry was prepared to resort to uni
lateral export restraint.

Again there was a problem of perception:

eagerness for voluntary restraint was interpreted by some Americans as
an admission of guilt.
With no particular solutions emanating from the Carter Administra
tion, the steel lobby stepped up pressures

on Congress.

1n the formation of Senate and House steel caucuses.

This resulted

Congressional

mobilization in support of the steel lobby's position was seen by the
Administration as a preview of Congressional "stonewalling" on the
Ml'N·agreement if influential lobbies such as steel were not satisfied.
Further encouraging the anti-import campaign, Treasury ruled on
Gilmore's suit that carbon steel plate from Japan was being sold in the
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United States at less than fair value, with a dumping margin estimated
Thus, according to the provisions

at an average of around 32 percent.

of the U.S. trade law, as of October 3, importers of Japanese steel
plate were required to post a bond equivalent to 32 percent of the

declared value of new shipments to pay the higher duties if deemed
necessary by the final determination.
to new shipments.

This itself was a deterrent

Japanese industry leaders were surprised at Treasury's

preliminary ruling and attributed it to the Japanese refusal to provide
the cost data.

(See Mueller and Kawahito, 1979b, p.9.)

The Treasury ruling on the Gilmore case encouraged similar suits
against European steelmaker~,

particularly after President Carter gave·

his blessing to the antidumping approach in his October 13 meeting with
domestic industry representatives.

Initially, the legal remedy of anti

dumping suits under the Trade Act of 1974 seemed a reasonable solution,
certainly preferable to quantitative restrictions on steel imports.
However, the Carter Administration had not really thought through how
to cope with a large number of antidumping cases and became panicky.
It did not have the staff ability to handle so many cases.
A more serious policy concern was how to avoid a major political
confrontation with Europe.

Many U.S. officials had come to realize

(from the FTC and Council on Wage and Price Stability studies) that
the Japanese were indeed the world's most efficient producers and
that their.dumping, if any, would not be widespread.

At the same time

it became increasingly clear that European firms had been engaged in

la~ge-scale dumping.

Japanese imports had levelled off for some time

in volume and declined as a share of imports in part in response to the
U.S. antidumping actions.
around August.

European imports _exceeded

Japanese from
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In September 1977, Carter asked Treasury Undersecret ary Anthony
Solomon to produce

a

plan which would defuse the domestic political

crisis in steel--to convince the industry the Administrat ion was ser

ious about helping it.

The plan was to address all of the industry's

problems--m odernization , environment al regulations , and trade.

In

early November there were press. reports the Solomon task force would

propose imported steel could be sold in the United States at or 5 per
cent below a price based on production costs of Japanese steel companies.
Meanwhile, Japanese and Common Market officials were being briefed
on the emerging price-orien ted mechanism to regulate imports.

In

effect, the Administrat ion was establishin g a system which discriminat ed
in favor of the Europeans, a conscious political choice.

By using

Japanese production costs, the system allowed most Europeans to con
tinue to sell in the American market below average costs without retalia
But the Japanese were not particularl y bothered; the system

tion.

would not cost them a great deal and would give them what they wanted-peace and higher prices.

Still, it took a face-to-fac e meeting between

Solomon and Inayama to dispel some uncertainty on the part of the
Japanese industry.
In a meeting with Treasury officials in Washington on November 18,
Hachio Iwasaki, Director of MITI's Iron and Steel Division, was informed
Japan should submit average cost data for the Big Six Japanese firms for

the purpose of determining the reference prices for imports.

Iwasaki

promised to submit such data within six weeks, and the Japanese companies

subsequentl y agreed.
The announcemen t of the TPM on December 2, 1977 had an immediate
effect.

Industry and Congression al outcries against the Japanese (and
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European) steel producers quickly subsided, and the highly politicized
U.S.-Japan steel issue of 1977 virtually came to an end.
was not the end.

However, that

Concern by US Steel over renewed imports in a softening

market in late 1979 led to new antidumping suits and a suspension of the

TPM in March 1980, and its resumption in October following intense
negotiations.

That process is traced in Section V; first, however, the

trigger price mechanism itself is described.

IV.

The Trigger Price Mechanism
Trigger prices were first announced in January 1978.

They took

effect from May 1, 1978 to provide a grace period for import contracts
already signed and to allow importers and foreign producers time to
adjust to the system.

The TPM has the following general features:

1). The average cost of production in dollars of the most efficient

foreign steel producer is determined.
2)

This becomes the trigger price.

All steel imported at or above the trigger price, plus trans-

port costs, will not be subjected to government-initiated antidumping

investigations; such imports can enter freely.
3)

Steel imports at less than the trigger price automatically

initiate investigation of possible dumping and injury.

If dumping

is found (using the constructed value definition) and injury ·has oc
curred, countervailing duties are applied to all shipments by that
fo~eign producer so that its average cost of production (higher than
the trigger price) becomes the effective minimum price for its ex
ports to the American market.
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The TPM involved important assumptions .

First, it was to be a

substitute for antidumping suits initiated by the steel companies, as
well as for any use of quantitativ e import restriction s.

Originally

Treasury (since 1980 Commerce) has had responsibil ity for assembling
data and for taking action.

While the steel companies could not be

denied their right under the law to initiate antidumping suits, it was
made clear if they did so to any substantial degree the government

would terminate the TPM.

At the same time the government informed

the Europeans they did not have an unlimited license to dump.
Second. the TPM was viewed as a temporary measure, until the
gradual increase in world demand eliminated the overhang of excess
capacity so that world pricing returned to normal (Solomon Report.
While only implicit in the Solomon ~eport, it was made

1977. p. 20).

clear in October 1980 resumption of the TPM that the American and
European industries would be expected to scrap or modernize obsolete
facilities so as to become fully efficient.

4._discusse d later, the TPM was

to last no longer than five years from the fall of 1980, with the
pnQ~ihili~y nf

t~rmination after three years if the U.S. industry

does not make adequate progress in rationaliza tion.
Utilization of the TPM brought on a number of iunnediate practical
problems.
ministered?

How were costs to be estimated?

How would the system be ad

Considerabl e effort has gone into resolving these issues

and problems. The determinati on of the average cost of production of the
most efficient (i.e. lowest cost) producer has been a central concern.
the individual plant or firm level such data are regarded as proprietary
and highly secret.

The agreement of MITI and the Japanese industry to

provide production cost data averaged for the Big Six producers has
been an essential ingredient for the TPM.

At
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The initial estimates of Japanese costs of production had to
be made quickly, within three weeks; the team of .American specialists

was very small.

The first Japanese cost estimates appeared low to

the American officials, in part because of different assumptions con
cerning steel yields and fixed costs.

While there apparently was no

explicit, politically-determined minimum reference price based on

then-current U.S. prices, it was understood by the Solomon Task Force

staff that the average cost of Japanese production plus transport
.costs had to be within politically acceptable limits (say 5-10 percent
below US prices) or the TPM was not a feasible solution.

Fortunately,

the .American estimates were within an acceptable range; the continued
appreciation of the yen during fall 1977 fortuitously helped make
that possible.
Estimation of costs of production is difficult.

It involves con

ceptual and definitional as well as measurement problems.

All the

evidence indicates the Japanese have been scrupulously honest in
provision of the basic data; this has never been a serious source of
rnnrPnrinn_

Mo~r ronrPprn~1

controversies tended to evaporate as

the Japanese industry came to realize it would benefit more from
cost estimates on the high rather than the low side.

Kawahito and

Mueller have argued in a series of technical papers that costs have
been overestimated in the trigger price calculation; not surprisingly
the .American steel industry has suggested underestimation.

Regardless,

the data used are an upward-biassed approximation of lowest foreign
costs of production, since Japanese firms are not equally efficient in
all products and since other foreign mills may produce specific products
more cheaply.
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The cost structure in setting the trigger price formula contains.
the following main elements: raw materials, direct and indirect labor
costs and output/man-hour, steel yield rates from raw steel, and
capital costs.

Iron ore and coal costs are estimated directly in

dollars, the unit for import contracts; about one-third of costs
for Japanese integrated producers are dollar-denominated (Treasury

~ . May 15, 1979, p. 4).
The capital costs involve two controversial issues: the appropriate
operating rate (capacity utilization) for averaging depreciation, in
terest costs, and other fixed costs per ton of steel; and the appropri

ate profit rate.

The higher the capacity utilization rate used, the

lower average production costs. MITI at first proposed an 85 percent rate,
the twenty-year historic average.

The TPM administrators have in-

stead used the most recent five-year average, initially using 1973-77
annual data and from 1980 (first quarter)

quarterly data on the

justification this represented the business cycle.

The average rate

has typically been above the actual operating rate.
The Japanese permanent employment-system adds some fixity
to labor costs.

MITI in its cost calculations assumed labor costs

were 100 percent fixed, disadvantageous when utilization rates were

declining but advantageous when actual rates were less than the average
rate used, as has typically been the case.

The TPM administrators

have regarded both labor costs and other expenses as 50 percent fixed,
SO percent variable.

Depreciation is 90 percent fixed, interest costs

75 percent fixed (Treasury~, July 20, 1978).
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The profit rate is mandated under the 1974 Trade Act, so has not
The before-tax profit rate is set at

been a matter of contention.

8 percent of operating costs (raw materials, labor, and other expenses).
There is little economic rationale for this method, muchless for the
specific profit rate used.

The U.S. government has suggested (Treasury

Notice, July 20, 1978) that 8 percent translates into a 13.1 percent
pretax return on total steel-making assets and regarded this as reason
able.

Applying the ratio of fixed assets to equity from AISI's 1978

annual statistical report,results in a pretax return on net worth in the
United States of 14.5 percent.

However, since Japanese steel firms

are highly leveraged an 8 percent pretax profit on current costs
implies a far higher return on net worth, as is discussed later.
Japanese cost data, except for imported raw materials, are esti
mated in yen.

One burdensome issue has been what exchange rate to use

in an era of floating rates, especially since sales contracts are
~/ typically signed several months before shipment, muc\less delivery.
The TPM administrators used the 60-day average prior to announcement
of the trigger price for the coming quarter-rates prevailing some
4-7 months prior to the actual landing of steel in the United States.
The yen/dollar fluctuated widely between late 1977 and early 1980.
That had not been anticipated, and added an element of price fluctuation
undesired by an industry in which list prices change relatively in
frequently.

Because of the time lag, when the yen was appreciating the

trigger price underestimated the actual dollar cost and made Japanese

firms less competitive, and the reverse w~en the yen was depreciating.
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The Japanese industry complained bitterly about this aspect of the TPM
formula.

When the TPM was reinstitute d in fall 1980, it was revised so

that an average exchange rate for the latest 36 months is used.
Table-2 provides the U.S. government estimates of Japanese steel
making costs, and the trigger price in effect each quarter.

The TPM

formula has a flexibility band(~ 5 percent) to allow for temporary,
short-term disturbance s; while not used since fall 1980 it remains in
- effect in principle.

It was used in 1979 to moderate the swings in

Japanese cost estimates due to exchange rate fluctuation s.

Adjustments

were also made in the first quarter of 1980, despite the neglible
change in Japanese costs in dollar terms, apparently to placate the
American industry at a time when US Steel wa~ starting its threats to
· file its antidumping suits.
Establishme nt of the quarterly trigger price for steel is only
the first step.

There is also an adjustment for prices of specific

steel products, and the determinati on of transport costs.

The trigger

price is in terms of basic steel produced by integrated producers.
Separate trigger price estimates have been made for steel products
produced by electric furnaces.
As already noted

there are many different steel products, each

with its own well-define d characteris tics.
market price differ

The cost of production and

for each specific product.

Accordingly trigger

pr:f.ces have to be set not simply for "steel" but for a large number
of products.

The 1981 first quarter Trigger Price Mechanism Price

Manual uses 268 pages to list

by type of extra specificatio n.

trigger prices by product by port
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The Japanese cost of production estimates are for steel in Japan.
To this.:must be added the shipping costs to United States ports: ocean
freight, insurance, interest, and unloading charges.
by MITI.

Data are provided

The major component· is ocean freight; its cost is typically

in the 6-18 percent range of the trigger price, depending upon the
product and the port.

Steel (and other commodities ) enter the United

States in ports in four geographic areas: Pacific Coast, Atlantic
Coast. Gulf Coast, and Great Lakes.

From Japan, shipping costs are

lowest to the Pacific Coast. and increasingl y costly to the Gulf,
Atlantic and Great Lakes ports; the difference between Pacific and
Great Lakes is typically $20-30 per-ton.

These transport costs

significant ly affect the competitive ness in different regions of the
United States among American producers and importers.

Thus Europe's

historic markets are the Great Lakes and Atlantic coast, Canada's
industry is iocated close to the Great Lakes markets,and Japan has been
particularl y competitive in Pacific and Gulf markets.
Accordingly , the trigger price consists of the basic price for steel as
given in Table 2, appropriate cost adjustments for each product, plus
appropriate shipping costs.

This price is then compared with the

actual import price. adjusted where necessary to correspond to the

TP definition of unloading and handling costs.

are revised quarterly.

The trigger prices

As this description of the procedure implies,

substantial administrat ive and technical effort has been required to
put the TPM into place and make it work effectively .
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A further complication is that some efficient producers can

deliver certain products to certain ports at prices below the TPM

but not below their average cost of production.

This competitiveness

is further enhanced when the ye~ (and hence- the TPM) appreciates re
lative to their local currencies.

Such firms can request an investiga

tion of their costs of production and obtain preclearance to sell at
specified minimum prices below the TPM.

This clearly enables them

to outcompete all other exporters subject to the trigger price.

The

four Canadian steel producers sought and obtained preclearance on
their steel exports to the Great Lakes markets> thereby expanding
exports to the United States.

V.

Suspension and Reinstatement of the Trigger Price Mechanism
The Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) was suspended in March 1980 when

US Steel brought a massive antidumping suit against European producers.
This sudden turn of events created new uncertainty in international
steel trade and threatened

to cause a trade war with America's

European allies, the avoidance of which was the primary United States
motivation behind the establishment of the TPM in the first place.
This section will examine the interaction of political and economic
processes involving the suspension and the eventual reinstatement of
the TPM in October 1980.
There were several factors peculiar to this second phase of the
steel trade issue.
target.

First, Europe--rather ~ban Japan-was the main

Second, administrative jurisdiction over the TPM and anti-
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dumping (as well as countervailing-duty) enforcement had been trans
ferred from Treasury to Commerce in January 1980.

Third, two new steel

related institutions (one domestic, the othe·r international) had come
into existence: the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee (STC) created
in the United States in July, 1978 to coordinate steel policy discussions
among government, industry, and labor; and the OECD Steel Committee

established in October, 1978 as a forum for exchanging views on steel
industry and trade among OECD member countries.

US Steel Challenges the Administration
Under the TPM Japanese steel exports to the United States dropped
sharply in 1976 (Table 3).

Japanese producers were selling in the

U.S. market slightly above the trigger prices partly because the dollar
value ·rose as the yen appreciated vis-a-vis the dollar.

Moreover, Japan's

six major companies were resorting to self-imposed cutbacks to make sure
Japanese imports would not alarm the U.S. industry again.

They believed

that such self-restraint, on top of the TPM, would be necessary to help
the U.S. industry revitalize itself.
However, the U.S. industry did not get much respite from imports,
though they were able to raise domestic prices because of the TPM
depreciation of the dollar, as European steel imports declined less
rapidly, and imports from Canada and third-world countries actually
rose.

Moreover, US Steel's new chairman, David M. Roderick, shared

with the rest of the domestic industry the conviction that Carter's
domestic programs to help the industry did.not go far enough and
government tax and environmental regulations were still too rigid to
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the industry.

Under these circumstances, US Steel decided to spearhead

a major campaign seeking further improvements in the government's
steel-industry relief program.

US Steel persuaded the AISI to devote

considerable staff work in 1979 for the preparation of an industry
position ·paper (AISI, 1980) referred to as the "Orange Paper",
published in January 1980.

While evaluating the TPM as "an innovative

attempt to help deal with wholesale dumping," the paper called for
substantial changes in the mechanism (p. 56).

However, the paper spent

most of its pages building a case for stronger government support for
the industry's modernization and revitalization program.
While the "Orange Paper" was being put :.:ogether, US Steel was
preparing to file antidumping complaints against European producers.
In fact, the "Orange Paper" was prepared in part to set the stage.
US Steel executives apparently concluded that large-scale antidumping
suits against European producers would act as a useful political device to
force

the Administration to pay more serious attention to the plight

of the industry--prec isely because the United States wanted to avoid
a major political confrontation with Europe.

The media in the United States started reporting on the impending
US Steel suits in November 1979.

In early December interagency dis

cussions began at both staff and high-policy levels within the Adminis
tration on how to head off the suits and, in case this failed, on what

to do with the TPM.

US Steel seemed determined to go ahead.

In early

February 1980, Commerce Secretary Philip M. Klutznick and U.S. Special Trade
Representative Reubin Askew tried to work out a compromise whereby US

-36-

Steel would limit its antidumping complaints.

But the company would

have none of that because it wanted to maximize the political effect of
its

antidumping action.

Finally, well before the actual US Steel action,

the decision was made to maintain the TPM in the absence of antidumping suits

and to suspend it as soon as a single major complaint was made (Gordon,

1980, p. 558).
At first, the Europeans did not take the rumor of the US Steel suits
seriously, believing the threat was mainly directed at the U.S. government.
As one person interviewed said, "It must be Roderick's ploy to squeeze con-

cessions on government regulations. 11 But as the possibility of the suits became
more real, EC officials became anxious and wanted to head off the suits.
Japanese officials and industry leaders, for their part, were apprehensive
about the possible chaos U.S. antidumping complaints might bring to steel
trade, which they thought had been relatively well-handled under the TPM.
They were aiso concerned about what they considered a lack of serious

U.S. efforts to revamp the domestic industry.
On March 19, 1980, the Commerce Department, after considerable

delay, announced that the trigger price would not be changed for the

second quarter and at the same time made a last-minute attempt to
forestall the antidumping complaints by repeating the threat to sus
pend the TPM if US steel went ahead with the suits.

However, two

days later; the US Steel filed a massive antidumping suit against 16
steelmakers in seven European countries (France, West Germany, Belgium,

Lux~mbourg, Italy, Britain and the Netherlands), all of which had
problems of steel overcapacity and unemployment.

US Steel charged

that steel products accounting for 75 percent of the $1.5 billion in
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European steel shipped to the United States in 1979 were "dumped" or

sold at "less than fair value."
Why did U.S. Steel choose this particular timing for filing the

suit?

European imports--wh ich had been rapidly declining since late

1979--were reaching a nadir.

There are several possible explanation s.

It may simply have taken several months to prepare the 72 boxes of
documents for the complaints.

It is also possible US Steel waited because

Commerce was considered more receptive than Treasury to industry interests.
Moreover, the action may have been timed to produce maximum pressure
on Carter's re-election campaign.

Commerce would be required to make

its preliminary determinati on on the antidumping petitions filed
March 21 by Oclober 17 at the latest,

about two weeks before the

presidentia l election.
On April 10, the Commerce Department announced it had found

"sufficient evidence" to start antidumping investigatio ns.

Mindful

of the strong European frustration over the US Steel action and the
TPM suspension, Administrat ion officials emphasized the United States
would make its utmost effort to work,toward the reinstateme nt of the
TPM.

The Administrat ion was most anxious not to antagonize the

European allies at a time when the United States was accumulatin g a
large trade surplus with the European Community- -at an annual rate of

$20 billion--an d was energetical ly seeking cooperation in regard to
the seizure of hostages in Teheran and the Soviet Union invasion of
Af.ghanistan .
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The ITC Issues a Prelimin ary Determi nation
US Steel survived the first major test on its antidump ing action
May 7 when the Interna tional Trade Commission ruled 3 to 2 that there

was "reason able indicati on" of injury.

Within the Adminis tration as·

well as without , there had been efforts to persuade the ITC to dismiss
the complai nts.

In hearings leading up to the ruling, the Justice

Departm ent contende d imports were not the cause of US Steel's troubles
because imports as a portion of domestic steel consump tion actually
dropped from 18 percent in 1978 to 16 percent in 1979.

The Council

on Wage and Price Stabilit y joined Justice in argui~g US Steel's
problem s "had more to do with domestic competi tion than foreign imports ."
On

May 22, Lewis W. Foy, Chairman of Bethlehe m Steel and the AISI

hinted at a possibi lity of comprom ise.

"We want to avoid a trade war,"

he said, adding that some kind of comprom ise might be possible if the
TPM could be improved to reflect faithfu lly the producti on costs of
both Japan and the European Community.

But the European s were never

interest ed in the idea of setting higher trigger prices for the EC than
for Japan for obvious reasons.

This approach was never seriousl y con

sidered even by Commerce officia ls because the adminis tration would be
too cumbersome.

Co1IU11erce officia ls at one point suggeste d using Europea n,

instead of Japanes e, producti on costs for the TPM.

The idea was strongly

opposed by Japan for fear of being priced out of competi tion.

Moreove r,

as one officia l put it, "Europea n cost data are not very reliable and
may create all sorts of confusio n in the course of TPM enforcem ent."
Japanes e industry leaders resented repeated dumping allegati ons
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by ,us Steel, since they were the basis of the TPM itself.

They also

pointed out what they considered a gross inconsistency in the be
havior of the American steel industry.

They said certain American

companies were negotiating to sell South Korean and Southeast

Asian

mills hot-rolled coils at prices 10-20 percent below the trigger price
of $285 (FOB) per ton for the 1980 first quarter.

Nonetheless, the

threat of antidumping suits restrained any possible aggressive Japanese
selling in the American market during this TPM suspension period.
After the bitter experience of being made scapegoats in 1977 there
emerged a growing realization in the Japanese industry of the need
to speak up against accusations and allegations.

This feeling was

particularly strong among the younger generation of industry execu
tives and staff.

An "Overseas Public Relations Committee" had been

created within the Japan Iron and Steel Exporters Association (JISEA)
for the purpose of countering foreign allegations and disseminating
"correct" information about the Japanese steel industry.

This com

mittee brought up the subject of U.S. dumping in a paper put out
June 10 to rebut US Steel's criticism of Japanese dumping (JISEA, 1980).
Some Progress Toward TPM Reinstatement
The European steelmakers had been fully cooperating with Commerce's
antidumping investigations by submitting fairly detailed sales and pro
duction cost data.

They had little other choice.

Unless they sub

mitted their own data the United States would automatically use

domestically-available data, including that supplied by U~S. Steel.
Besides. any incentive to protect production secrets was weaker than
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that of Japanese, given the state of their industry.

In order to
It

verify the data the U.S. government sent inspectors to Europe.
was also feared the data might not be sufficiently reliable--not

necessarily because of cheating but because the EC Commission did
not necessarily have strong enough authority to obtain full coopera
tion.

Besides, methods of calculating production costs are not fully

consistent from company to company.

By late July

Commerce had collected substantial data about the

European steel industry.

As a result, there was now a real possibility

of having to impose substantial antidumping duties on most European
steel imports covered by the US Steel suits.

As this possibility

increased, the opposition on th~ part of some ranking Administration
officials (including Kahn, Miller and Schultze) to the TPM reinstate
ment gradually weakened in interagency discussions for fear of trigger
In

ing a major political confrontation with the European allies.

talks in Washington in July, the EC's Etienne Davignon drove home the

seriousness of the situation by making an implied threat that if the
TPM was not reinstated by late September the EC would be forced to
re-examine its entire trade policy with the United States.

Another

relevant development was that the EC Commission had become more serious
about reducing steel producing capacity in member countries and re
structuring the European steel industries.
The Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee

(STC) also played a

part in the resolution of the steel trade issue.

Composed of

representatives from government, industry, .and labor, the STC was created
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by Carter on July 26, 1978 for the purpose of serving "as a mechanism to
ensure a continuing cooperative approach to the problems and prospects
of the .American steel industry."

(STC Report to the President).

The

STC's role was crucial in developing recommenda tions for industry re
vitalizatio n acceptable to both the industry and the Administrat ion.
U.S. Steel Chairman Roderick, himself a member of the Committee, was
generally pleased with the STC work, for much industry data were
utilized by the STC, including the AISI's "Orange Paper," which Roderick
insisted the Committee use as a basis for analyzing modernizati on and
capital formation (Initial Report to the Working Group on Modernizati on
and Capital Formation, p. 5).

In August 1980 he began to voice his

view publicly that he would consider withdrawing US Steel's petitions
for dumping relief if it received "equivalent protection" in other
ways.

The internation al trade section of the report recommended "the TPM
,

should be reinstated in a restructed form that would remedy the defects,
asserted by industry, in the previous TPM and, during the period of industry
modernizati on, the U.S. market should not be disrupted by excess volumes of
imports." (SRC, 1980, p.13). On September 15 the Administra tion's Cabinet

level Economic Policy Group chaired by Treasury Secretary Miller approved
the substance of the report and forwarded it to the President for final
approval.
Meanwhile, Commerce Secretary Klutznick had not been able to persuade
Roderick to accept the specifics of the government proposal for reinstating

the TPM--though MITI had been advised in mid-August that a broad framework
of agreement had been reached.

The Administrat ion proposed an antisurge
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provision,

Specifically, the government would initiate investigations

if aggregate foreign imports increased beyond 15.2 percent of domestic
consumption when the domestic industry was operating below 85 percent
of capacity.

Roderick wanted the activation of the antisurge provision

even if the industry was operating above 85 percent and a trigger price

increase ~ell over the government proposal of 10 percent.

The compro

mise reached in late September was to raise the trigger price 12 percent,
and the antisurge provision would be activated if the industry operated
below 87 percent.

Commerce could have prolonged the negotiations but

the Administration was eager to settle the issue before October 17, the
deadline for Commerce to make ·a preliminary determination on the US
Steel antidumping suit.

The TPM is Restored
On

September 30, President Carter announced the reinstatement of

• the TPM and the withdrawal of the US Steel antidumping petitions.

There

was also a broad package of domestic programs proposed earlier by the
STC.

The President would recommend an amendment to the Clean Air and

Water Acts that would allow granting an individual steel mill
extension ·of up to three years for compliance.

an

In addition, the

rate of depreciation for equipment (which accounts for 85-90 percent

of the steel industry's fixed capital) would be about 40 percent
greater than permitted under current law, and there would also be a
full 10 percent regular investment tax credit for all new equipment
with more than a one-year life. along with an extra 10 percent credit
for capital investment (The President's Program, pp. 5, 9).
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Effective for steel shipped from October 21, the trigger prices
would be still determined on the basis of Japanese production costs and
the exchange rate would be calculated on the basis of a 36-month rolling
The TPM would be in effect for a maximum of five

average.
years.

If the industry were judged to be making adequate

progress toward modernization a_t the end of three years,

the TPM would remain in effect for the full period.

Otherwise,

it would be terminated.

A Comparative Analysis of the

Firstmd Second Political Phases

During the first phase the steel issue was increasingly escalated
and led to the firestorm of the fall of 1977--despite the willingness
of the Japanese government and industry to cooperate.

The principal

reason was that American officials did not understand the seriousness
of the issue, partly a result of the ignorance of the new Administration,
and partly because of the low profile of the issue early on. Lack of sufficient
government response to calls for import relief in early 1977 made industry and labor leaders even more vociferously attack imports (particularly

Japanese), linking trade problems to unfair practices of foreign firms
and government.

Hence the politicization of the issue.

During the second phase, by contrast, escalation of the issue
triggered by the US Steel's antidumping complaints was avoided because

the Administration moved quickly--even before the complaints were
actually filed--in trying to work out a compromise with US Steel and

the European Community.

The Administration had a more receptive ear,

and the industry did not feel the need to launch a massive lobbying
campaign.

-44-

What explains this difference?

First, the industry's anti-import_

campaign in 1977 (particularly before September that year) was multi
facetted and did not necessarily focus on antidumping actions on which
the Administration was legally bound to act within a specified time
period.

The industry in 1976-77 was more interested in the traditional

quantitative restriction approach.

The 301 Complaint filed in

October 1976 by the AISI did not require the Administration to come
up with a decision in a definite time frame.

The industry could also

have filed for relief under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, which
has deadlines for action.

But the industry chose not to, apparently

because it was not certain of winning an affirmative ITC decision.
Among Carter aides there was much opposition to the quantitative ap
proach both for fear of adding fuel to inflation and because of its
inferiority to price-oriented mechanisms of import restraint.

Con

sequently, the Administration delayed action.
In contrast, the US Steel's· antidumping action in March 1980
was a well-focused and carefully-prepared move which politically (as
well as legally) forced the Administration into an immediate response.
Second, the steel issue in 1977 was allowed to escalate because
Japan, not Europe, was the main target.

Making Japanese steelmakcrs

scapegoats was politically useful in winning public sympathy; it was

difficult for U.S. officials to be sensitive to Japanese interests,
especially.in light of Japan's huge bilateral trade surplus.

On

the

other hand, the European Community which became the target of the 1980
US.Steel antidumping action, had been piling up a large trade deficit,
and the U.S. political climate was not conducive to the berating of
Europe, despite the open secret that the TPM enabled the Europeans
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to continue to dump steel.

Moreover, American policymak ers feared the

Europeans might retaliate by launching their own antidumpi ng and
other actions against such major U.S. exports as soybeans, synthetic

textiles, and petrochem icals.

A related factor was the growing real

ization among U.S. officials in 1977 that the Japanese were not in
volved in dumping as extensive ~y as the Europeans , if at all.

It

was only after major antidumpi ng complaint s were filed against tbe
Europeans in the fall of 1977 that the administr ation became serious
about developin g the TPM.

Third, unnecessa ry escalatio n of the issue was avoided in 1980
because, unlike 1977, the Administ ration was sensitive to both domestic
and European (as well as Japanese) steel interests through the Steel
Tripartit e Counnittee and the OECD Steel Committee .

By the time the

US Steel action was brought against the Europeans eight months after
the STC started working, governmen t represent atives on the STC, including
Commerce Secretary Klutznick and USTR Askew, were well informed of what
the industry wanted.

Without the comprehen sive industry revitaliz ation

program that the STC recommended in September US Steel would not .have
withdrawn its antidumpi ng complaint s and thus the issue would have be
come enormousl y more difficult to resolve.

Moreover, the fact that

the STC provided a regular forum where industry and labor leaders
could speak their minds before ranking Administ ration officials in
closed sessions reduced the necessity of politiciz ing the issue
through lobbying in Congress and through media campaigns as had been
done in 1977.

Last but not least, Commerce and USTR officials were united in
efforts to work out a compromi se.

At the highest level, Klutznick
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directly negotiated with Roderick, and Askew with Davignon.

This

cooperative relationship was related in part to the transfer of
administrative jurisdiction over antidumping and countervailing
duties from Treasury to Commerce in January 1980.

Treasury has been

known to be more free-trade-orie nted than either Commerce or the USTR.
Also, in 1977, USTR-head Strauss and Treasury Secretary Blumenthal did
not get along well.

VI.

An Evaluation of the Trigger Price Mechanism

The Economic Rationale
The previous sections describe how the trigger price mechanism
came about, was suspended, and reinstated.

Two objectives of the

U.S. government stand out: to provide some help for the American in
dustry by restriction of imports; and to prev~nt major confrontation
with the European Community.

Relations with Japan were also a concern,

but as it came to be perceived that the Japanese industry was indeed
efficient and not QubQini7Pn 5 i~

w~~

not the ~entral issue.

these policy aims, what then was the most efficient approach?

Given
The

policymakers (Blumenthal, Solomon, Bergston, Cooper) realized that
price mechanisms were preferable to quantity restraints.

Antidumping

suits and investigations was neither politically desirable nor adminis
tratively feasible, as the Administration quickly realized in fall 1977

when it went that route.

Nor was the imposition of a tariff feasible;

it could be subject to retaliation, and would be directly counter to

the intent of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations under way.
The TPM can be viewed two ways: as simply a technique for more
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of settin g
effici ent admin istrati on of laws again st dumping; or as a way

a minimum price for steel in the U.S. marke t.
strume nt of protec tion agains t impor ts.
TPM ~~•

Either way it is an in

The real culpr it is not the

but the protec tionis t provis ion in the U.S. 1974 Trade Act

margi nal
which newly define s fair value in terms of averag e rather than
costs of produ ction.

Koo (1979) provid es a nice analy sis of the TPM as a minimum price
system .

While tariff s and quotas have an equiv alent effici ency impac t

not the
under perfec t.com petitio n domes tically and worldw ide, this is
Europe ;
case for the steel indust ry in the United States , Japan, or
less
where indus tries have oligop olistic marke t power , tariff s impose
social cost than quotas (Morkre and Tarr, 19RO, ch. 1).

Koo makes the

ically
follow ing assum ptions : the U.S. steel indus try behave s oligo polist
s margi nal
(i.e. it faces a declin ing margin al revenu e curve and equate
comrevenu e and rising margin al cost); steel impor ts are suppli ed
.

less than
petiti vely into the U.S. marke t; and the TPM minimum price is
the U.S. price with tariff s impose d.

He demon strates analy tically that

under
under the TPM not only will the U.S. price of steel be below that
ction
tariff protec tion, but that impor ts can be less and U.S. produ
(and profit s) greate r as well.

These result s derive essen tially from

tinuou s
the fact TPM makes the U.S. indust ry margi nal revenu e curve discon
nt.
with a horizo ntal portio n where the minimum price becomes releva
of
This analy sis ignore s the distri butio nal implic ations among buyers
to the
steel. produ cers, and taxpay ers,sin ce tariff revenu es accrue
govern ment and the trigge r price minimum does not.
The TPM benef itted foreig n firms relati ve to the impos ition of
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a tariff since the higher revenues accrued to them.

In fact> the

average cost formula made the unit profits on Japanese sales to the
American market high indeed; and total profits even on a smaller
export volume substantially higher than would have occurred under

free trade during this period.

It is not clear whether the TPM

benefitted Japanese firms relative to a quota.

Presumably their

prices and revenues would have been even higher under a quota system.
However, since the Administration apparently never seriously considered
quotas, this question is moot.
Technically, the TPM does not set a minimum price for steel imports;
selling below it triggers quickly-instituted government investigations

to determine whether dumping has occurred.

However, because the TPM is

based on the average costs of p·roduction of the most efficient producer
(the Japanese industry), any firm exporting to the United States below
that price must be selling below its average costs of production, i.e.
dumping.

Moreover, the implication is that if significant quantities

of imports take place, injury is occurring.
Note. however, that non-Japanese foreign

the

U.S. market at the trigger price are selling below their average costs
of production, since they are (by definition and in reality in most
cases) less-efficient producers.

In effect they have a license to

dump as defined in terms of average costs.

The argument is that these

sales do not constitute injury to the American industry, as they simply

refl~ct competition between Japanese and non-Japanese foreign producers
in the American market for a given total import share as determined by
the interaction of U.S. demand and supply at the given trigger price,
so long as efficient foreign producers have excess capacity (Solomon
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Report, 1977. p. 18).

This argument is valid since Japan had a large

excess capacity over the 1975-80 period.

Since Japanese firms are

forced to sell at average costs while others can sell at marginal
costs. conceptuall y the Japanese are at a competitive disadvantag e vis
a vis other foreign suppliers.

The ~osition of the U.S. government has been that the trigger price
mechanism is an efficient way to administer the antidumping law, and is
not in itself a protectioni st instrument.

The Solomon Report {1977)

suggests two major criticisms of the case-by-cas e antidumping procedure:
the long time it took to process a dumping complaint by a U.S. produceri
and the draconian impact on imports where dumping is found.

8

In fact the TPM is an instrument of pro~ection: it is a more compre
hensive means of administeri ng the average cost {constructe d value) defin
ition of dumping in the U.S. law.

The Gilmore ease was the first

application o~ the constructed value approach since the passage of the
1974 Trade Act.

The TPM is an extension of this new, and protection ist,

principle to all steel trade. Moreover, it applies a particularl y protection
ist interpretat ion of the 1974 Trade Act. The Act requires that sales be made
"at prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of
time in the normal course of time."

It can be argued a reasonable period

in the business cycle, that profits in boom offset losses or very low profits
in recession, and hence marginal {or less than average) cost pricing is

80nce an antidumping suit was filed, it took the Treasury and ITC
13 months on average to process the complaint; the six-month lapse
between preliminary and final determinati on so increase the uncertainty
and risk of duties to be paid that imports of affected products cease,
as noted earlier.

-soacceptable as long as profits are reasonably averaged over the cycle.
However, the TPM as set up requires continuous covering of costs.
"The lack of a cyclical allowance [for profits] appears to be at
variance with the intent of Congress."

(Morkre and Tarr, 1980, p. 171).

Administration of the TPM
The actual monitoring and enforcement of the TPM is done by U.S.
Customs at the various ports, under the general guidance first of Treasury
and since 1980 of Commerce.

A GAO study (Government Accounting Office,

1980) provides an evaluation of the monitoring of the TPM from its
inception through early May 1979.

It documents that at the beginning

the actual administration was rather loose: lags in Customs reporting
to Washington; errors in calculating trigger price comparisons; inadequate
evaluation of related-party transactions; inadequate case follow-up from
Washington to determine whether dumping had actually occurred.
The study also found that, once initial investigations had been done
for preclearance of specific Canadian mill products, all Canadian
steel had been entering under automatic preclearance for entry below
trigger prices.

The GAO estimated that about 6 percent (355,700 tons)

of steel imports between October 1, 1978 and March 1, 1979 were in
serious violation of the trigger price floors.

Of this, cases in

volving only 61,800 tons had been pursued for antidumping investiga
tions.

Only one case involved a Japanese company; it was not acted

on.
The GAO study was critical of Treasury administration of the TPM.
Certain of its recommendations have been put into practice by Commerce.
However, the GAO criteria for evaluation are narrow.

Treasury argued
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that the main purpose of the TPM was to eliminate injury done to the ·
American steel industry throu·gh dumping of imported steel.

It suggested

that serious violations (the estimated 6 percent of imports) was
minimal, and caused no injury relative to overall U.S. consumption .
However the relevant criterion is whether specific products are
being imported at "less than fair value."

The results of the anti

dumping investigatio ns to date suggest that injury has not been sub
stantial.

Treasury further argued the day-to-day administrat ions,

which admittedly should be improved, was cost-effect ive despite delays.
In effect, the main impact of the TPM is as a deterrent.
To some extent the GAO report was counterprod uctive because it
implied the government was not seriously enforcing the TPM, so evasion
was a relatively low-risk strategy.

There is some suggestion that by

late 1979 evasion was becoming a real problem, especially where foreign
producers and American importers were related (subsidiari es, etc.).
Their share of total imports had risen from 40 percent to 60 percent
(GAO, 1980, p. 21).

Their activities were inadequatel y monitored.

No transaction s between these (or other firms) above trigger prices
were ever audited--a major GAO criticism.

The one case of possible

fraud in misrepresen ting import prices brought before a Federal
grand jury as of early 1981 involved allegations Mitsui & Co. USA
had made false declaration s to U.S. Customs for steel imports to

West Coast markets in 1979 and had sold below the trigger price.
This somewhat surprising situation, given the general policy of the
Bi~ Six to exercise self-restra int in exports, may be due to the fact
that Kaiser Steel, the main West Coast producer,

had instituted a

vigorous program of pricing its products below the trigger prices.
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The Economic Impact of the TPM
It is difficult to determine with much accuracy the impact of
TPM on American and Japanese producers and consumers of steel because
so many factors influence supplies and demands and because it is not

Nonethe

clear what the alternative American policy would have been.
less, some crude appraisals can be made.

The volume of imports and

the ratio of imports to domestic apparent supply dropped sharply
following the imposition of the TPM from May 1978 (Table 3).
proportiona te share of the decrease was borne by Japan.

A dis

This evidently

was the result of decisions by Japa~•s Big Six pro~ucers to exercise
self-restra int in the American market (see references to this behavior
in Steel Tripartite Committee. 1979 and Kawahito, 1980a).

This was not

in the form of a (known) private voluntary agreement among the Japanese
producers; that would have been illegal under U.S. antitrust laws.
Nor was it the result of Japanese government legislation or even MITI

formal guidance.

Rather, it seems to have been the consequence of

a general concensus within the industry and a fear of antagonizin g
competitors , perhaps enhanced by the leadership behavior by Nippon
Steel and its chairman Mr. Inayama.

Japanese producers have continued

not to sell aggressivel y in the American market even at the trigger
prices.

EC producers reduced their exports much less sharply, and

Canada actually increased exports.

A rule of thumb developed among

1n4ustry leaders (not necessarily shared by smaller firms or younger
leaders-to- be) that the United States would accept a 15 percent import
penetration rate, and that it was reasonable for that import share
be divided roughly one-third each among Japan, the EC, and others.
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Given Japan's strong competitive position this seems a remarkably

conservative stance, though it may in fact have been profit-maxi
mizing.

The decrease in imports came at a time American demand for steel
was rising.

The American industry benefitted in terms of substantially

increased shipments in 1978 and the first three quarters of 1979.

It

is difficult to determine the degree to which the TPM contributed to
the decrease in import volume.

The decline is attributable not only

to the initial rise in the import price of steel to TPM minimum levels,
but also to the subsequent increases in the trigger prices which made

imports less competitive.

In 1978 this was due almost entirely to the

depreciation of the dollar relative to both the yen and the European
currencies.

In one sense this was windfall to American producers since

it was built ·into the TPM minimum price formula, and had not been
anticipated by policymakers.

In a broader context the U.S. steel

industry had been penalized in competing with imports by the over
valued dollar, so depreciation was no more than a macro-economic
adjustment toward an equilibrium rate.

However, relative strength

of the dollar between early 1979 and early 1981 offset part of this
windfall.

All of the increase in the trigger import price since

early 1979 has been due to rising costs, common in degree if not
absolute amount for all steel producers.

Table 4 provides comparative data on annual rates of price in
creases in the United States for general producer prices, steel mill
products, steel import prices, and the trigger price.

It is striking
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that domestic steel prices rose less rapidly following the imposition
of the TPM than the general producer price index.

Bradford (Steel

Quarterly, February 1979, p. 4) points out that discounts from list
prices (used for the index) were prevalent in 1977 so the 1978 increase
was closer to 15 percent than the 10.7 percent recorded.

There was

also some discounting from list prices in late 1980.
The sharp increase in import prices in the first year of the
TPM is also noteworthy.

Part was probably due to the once-and-for-all

_upward adjustment to the TPM minimum price levels; most however is
attributable to the appreciation of foreign currencies.

This makes it

all the more difficult to separate out the effects of do_llar deprecia
tion and the TPM on domestic steel prices and levels of imports.
Crandall (1980a, p. 23) estimates that through 1979 the TPM raised

steel import prices by about 10 percent, prices of U.S. mill products
by about 1 percent, and steel prices in the United States by about 2.4
percent; the direct effect on the U.S. price level in 1978-79 was no

more than 0.1 percentage points.

The rise in prices due to the TPM

cost American consumers about $1 billion annually.

Since the major

impact of the TPM was on import prices, roughly two-thirds of this
transfer accrued to foreign exporters (in dollars, less in terms of
appreciated own currencies) and one-third to American steel producers.
Roger E. Alcaly, Chief Economist for the Council on Wage and Price
Stability, in testimony at hearings on the TPM in December 1979
estimated that the TPM increased steel import prices by about 8 per

cent and domestic steel prices by about 1.5 percent; of the $1.1

.

billion increase in revenues $600 million went to foreign firms, $500
million to American firms (GAO, 1981, p. 6-15).

The price impact was
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decrease in import volume.

The effect on steelwo rker employment was

minimal> a maximum of 12,000 jobs accordin g to Crandal l (1980a, p. 24).
Protecti on is in steel as in other industri es a very expensi ve way
to create or maintain jobs.
The TPM has proven highly profitab le for the Japanes e steel in
dustry.

The formula 8 percent pretax profit rate on current costs

transla tes into a pretax return on equity for Japanese firms of
41-46 percent because of the high debt/eq uity ratios.

(For 1975-77

current costs were 82-83 percent of sales and sales were 6.18-6.9 5
times equity (Tekko Tokei Y~ran, 1979).)

In 1976 and early 1977 the

depresse d J·apa'lese steel industry had engaged in vigorou s price
competi tion in selling in the U.S. market.
benefit ting, not Japanese produce rs.

American consume rs were

It is not surprisi ng the Japanese

industry was willing to negotia te any restrict ion on its exports that
.would result in substan tial price increase s.

The TPM has been a

particu larly benefic ial mechanism for Japanese produce rs.

It mandate d

high profits at TPM prices below which its foreign competi tors could
not readily compete {withou t invoking the threat of an anti-dum ping
investig ation), and below which the American industry usually chose
not to compete .
The alternat ives for the Carter Adminis tration were the TPM,
antidum ping suits, or import quotas.

Quotas seemed clearly inferio r.

Pursuit of the antidum ping approach has high politic al costs, as
stressed in Sections III and V.
(retalia tory) economic costs.

It also has direct and indirec t
Crandal l (i980a, p. 23) argues that

antidum ping suits would have disrupte d the flow of imports far more,
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and would have made conditions possible for greater price increases
. by-American producers.

Certainly antidumping suits increase sharply

the risk and uncertainty of importing, as stressed above.

Thus, the

TPM appears to have been a reasonable political compromise under the
circumstances.

But it is nonetheless a substantial step in the

protectionist direction.

VII.

Future Prospects
U.S.-Japan trade in steel has now developed its own mechanisms

and behavioral patterns.

In this section we briefly consider six

broad areas: world steel supply and demand; the TPM itself; the
Japanese steel industry; American steel industry modernization; U.S.
government policy options vis-~-vis the American steel industry; and,
briefly, some of the broader implications.
First, how long will the present world excess steel capacity
persist?

The key

is the European steel industry, in terms both of

trade policies and trade flows.

As long as the European industry

has substantial excess capacity it

to the

United States at less than average costs of production.

The lesson

of the TPM experience is that it has the political clout to do so.
American steel users benefit, and the wider economic and political
costs to the United States of imposing antidumping duties on imports
from Europe are too great.

Two

factors will reduce European excess

capacity: a growth of world {especially European) demand for steel;
and a restructuring of the steel industry by scrapping or modernizing

obsolete steel production facilities.
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Forecasts of world steel demand are hazardous, more so even
than with steel capacity.

It seems

unlikely that by the mid-

1980s shortages will occur, despite some projections to that effect.

Substantial excess capacity exists in Europe and Japan; modest ad
ditions to capacity can be fairly readily achieved in existing facil
ities.

The expansion of capacity in developing countries is likely

to be only commensurate with demand growth in the next five years
(Florkoski; OECD, 1980~p. 11).

Moreover, the world price of steel

is low--below the level necessary to sustain existing capacity levels
indefinitely.

As

the world supply-demand gap narrows, the relative

as well as absolute price of steel can be expected to increase.
that appears some years away.

But

In the interim the steel industry is

unlikely to achieve average levels of profitability of all manufactur
ing in Europe or the United States, and perhaps Japan as well, unless
the rules of the trade game are substantially altered as to provide
very substantial insulation from import price competition.

This seems

unlikely, and certainly would be undesirable.

Second, what are the prospects for the TPM?
possibility the Reagan administration will end it.
ternatives to the TPM below.

There is always the
We consider al

Here the issue is whether the revised

TPM will be a credible deterrent.

Much lies in the effectiveness,

or at lea~t the perceptions of the effectiveness, of the administration

of .the TPM.

There are many avenues for evasion by opportunists.

The

GAO (1981, pp. 7-24) is skeptical that it can be administered effectively.
The Commerce staff is small.

Much will depend on success in auditing

-58-

transactions, and in generating highly-publiciz ed cases of fraud to
which severe penalties are attached, as well as antidumping investi
gations themselves.

The administrative difficulties in enforcing the

TPM are in effect a built-in mechanism to ensure its temporariness.
Apparently some of its inventors were aware of that from the start.
From the perspective of steel users and consumer welfare, the
optimal system under current law is one sufficiently credible to the
American steel industry that it does not bring it down with anti-dumping suits and yet sufficiently porous in terms of low Japanese
costs of production, preclearance of even more efficient firms in
other nations, and evasion, that a high degree of import competition
is maintained.

This balance is difficult to achieve--as the 1980

US Steel suit demonstrated.
Third, what about the Japanese industry?

It is secure in its

current position as world low-cost producer, and confident that in
the longer run it can remain competitive through product specializa
tion and continuing product and process innovations that raise pro
ductivity.

Yet it is unlikely to build any new, major integrated

plants in the foreseeable future.

As a mature industry with sophisti

cated leaders, it is likely to continue its policy of caution and high
unit profits in the American market in anticipation of potential
political problems, and to continue to seek export diversification .
The industry will generate substantial cash flow; while some will be
used to reduce debt/equity ratios, investment in foreign iron ore and
coal mines also appears likely.
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The TPM has some inherent problems for the Japanese industry,
though so far it has proven an immensely profitabl e device.

While

Japanese firms appear to be willing to play by the rules, they fear
others will not--that Japan will be undercut by others evading the
trigger price floors.
requested precleara nce.

Several Korean pipe producers have recently
Apparentl y they are purchasin g steel from

Japan at relativel y low (marginal cost?) prices, and hence are able
to fabricate pipe at costs below Japanese average costs.

· More

broadly, not only Canadian firms but very efficient European producers
of certain steel products are currently requestin g precleara nce at
prices below the TPM applicabl e to Japanese firms.

If this should

become widesprea d it could both reduce Japanese competiti veness and
undermine the political assumptio ns of the TPM itself.
Fourth, what are the prospects for the American steel industry?
It faces fundamen tal structura l problems: it has lost comparati ve
advantage , and has the overhang of substanti al obsolete capacity.
Its wage rates are relativel y very high (now 75 percent above those
for all American manufact uring), and almost double Japanese steel
worker wages; union power has been strong, and it has reduced con
siderably the ability to compete against imports.

The industry 's

applicati on of process technolog y lags--the still-low rate of continuou s
casting is an outstandi ng example.
ing (see OTA 1980, pp. 96-97).

Its rate of R&D is low and declin

It has engaged in inadequat e investmen t

in steelmaki ng to modernize facilitie s rapidly.

It has a major problem

of access to finance-- perhaps its most serious problem.

The ratio of

total liabiliti es to equity by 1979 was 124 percent; profit rates are

L
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below the average for all manufacturing; dividend rates remain stable
and high.

The industry argues it is difficult to increase private

long-term borrowing or equity issue significantly, and hence funds
111.1st be obtained through higher profit conditions and faster rates of
capital cost recovery through more rapid depreciation rates.
Industry strategy has involved a mix of investment for moderniza
tion of steel capacity. diversification into nonsteel activities. and
- the seeking of government assistance through protection from imports
and a variety of domestic programs.

In recent years about one-quarter

of new investment has gone into diversification.

This is not an

unwise policy--so long as the American people are not asked to subsidize
the indu~try.

Investment rates are inadequate to bring about rapid

restructuring of the industry; the incentives are apparently insuf
_ficient. judged by industry statements and performance.
Whether the industry can restructure itself so as to become·
more competitive is the key issue for trade policy.

have not necessarily been bad.
~

Indications so far

For the first time in recent years,

US Steel reported a small profit in its steel division for 1980.

'nlis was made possible in part by permanently closing 15 older plants
employing 12,500 workers in 1979.
continue this consolidation effort.
technology and production methods.

The company seems determined to
Many firms are adopting Japanese
Indeed US Steel was seeking

assistance from Sumitomo Metals and Nippon Steel for blast furnance

technology even while preparing its antidumping cases.

Nonetheless,

it appears unlikely that the industry will succeed both in restructur
ing itself and in maintaining an 85 percent share of the American
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market without specific government support in one form or another.

This brings us

to United States government policy options

for the American steel industry.

There are three broad choices, which

can be termed the efficient core option, the renewal option, and the
high investment option.

The efficient core option is to scrap obsolete plant and to base
the industry on the remaining modern mills, integrated and electric
- furnace.

At its most pessimistic the AISI estilI1ates up·-to 20 percent

of capacity might be eliminated (Orange Paper, 1980, p. 39).

This

would leave capacity in excess of 113 million tons, which as Crandall
stresses, is far more than enough for a national security crisis

(1980a, p. 24).
core option.

Crandall is one of the main-proponent s of the efficient

It also seems to be implicit in the Report of the Japan-

United States Economic Relations Group (January 1981, pp. 76-77).
This option like the others would benefit from a general policy to
increase incentives for investment, saving, and R&D for all industries;
It would

it would not require specific policies targeted for steel.

make possible free trade in steel even with marginal cost pricing.

The renewal option is suggested by the Office of Technology
Assessment (1980, especially chapters 2 and 10).

It would require

an increase in industry investment for modernization from the past
average of $2 billion to about $3 billion (1978 dollars).

The main

emphasis would be placed upon new electric furnace mills,

with

some modernization of integrated mills; the electric furnace

.

market share would almost double to 25 percent.

Capacity would expand

to meet demand growth; imports would be at about the 15 percent level
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(apparently assuming the TPM would remain in place).

This option

would require a modest rate of direct government support targetted

to the steel industry.
The high investment option is propounded by the AISI, and was
supported by the Steel Tripartite Committee under the Carter adminis
tration.

It would require annual investment rates for modernizati on
Most would go for

on the order of $4.9 billion (1978 dollars).

modernizati on and capacity expansion of existing integrated mills.

This option requires substantial government support--thr ough higher
relative prices and profits by restricting imports, and/or capital
subsidies and related measures.

Crandall (1980a, p. 24) estimates

a 9 percent increase in relative prices would generate $4 billion in

annual profits (at the expense of consumers), and would employ 36,000
new people at most.

This annual subsidy for employment would be

expensive-- about $110,000 per new job created.
Associated with these options are alternative packages of policy
instruments .

The renewal and high investment options require some

degree of government support for the industry.

The cost falls on

American taxpayers and consumers, who on average are less well off
than steel workers, management, and stockholder s.

For import pro

tection the government can choose among quotas (OMAs, VRAs), industry
antidumping suits, or the TPM, at least for the period of restructuri ng.
If the government intends to move toward the classical free trade pos
ition it would have to get rid of the TPM.

But that would imply a

more fundamental reform: revision of the i974 Trade Act so as to return
to the original, price criteria for dumping, and to relegate average
cost of production and constructed value to a minor role.
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Finally, one should be aware of a number of broader implications.
of US trade policy in steel--for trade policy generally, for American
industrial structure, for US-Japan relations.

The extension of the

average cost of production criterion for dumping to other industries

would be a major protectionist step, as would attendant extension of
the TPM to other products.

Moreover, trade in steel must not be

viewed in a partial equilibrium context.

The price of steel in the

United States has become substantially above that in Japan, and
indeed in a number of countries.

This directly affects the competitive
Automobiles is one obvious and

strength of industries using steel.
extreme example.

But the high cost of steel will hurt, to varying

degrees, the competitiveness of many other steel-fabricati ng American
industries too.
We do not predict what will occur in steel trade and trade policy.
Our guess is that in five years\time, when the TPM is to expire, these
basic problems will still be with us.

Neither the American nor

European steel industries will have restructured sufficiently to
restore adequate competitivenes s.

World excess capacity in steel

will have diminished but not eliminated.

It will be politically so

difficult that any more liberal definition of dumping will not be
legislated, in the United States or in GATI.

Problems in steel trade

will not disappear; trade will be substantial, and rather competitive,
but at higher prices, lower volumes, and less competitive thrust than
under true free trade.

The TPM, with all its proolems, seems likely

to be with us for some time to come since it embodies a political
compromise among all the main actors.
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The pattern of politic ization of the U.S.-Ja pan steel trade
issue has both specif ic and genera l feature s.
trade issues followe d a familia r pattern .

Previou s U.S.-Ja pan

First, growing Japane se

import s cause a U.S. domest ic industr y to seek impo~t relief from
Then, the U.S. governm ent asks its Japane se counte r

its governm ent.

part to accept some type of export quanti ty restra int.

The Japane se

governm ent refuses to comply due to domest ic industr y opposi tion, and
the issue becomes increas ingly politic ized as it remain s unreso lved.
This is the pattern seen most clearly in the U.S.-Ja pan textile
wrangl e of 1969-71 (Destle r, Fukui and Sato, 1979).

The steel issue

has not fully conform ed to this pattern .
It is true that increas ing Japane se steel imports did cause the
U.S. industr y to seek U.S. governm ent actions in reducin g import s in
1977.

But inter-g overnm ental negoti ations in the traditi onal sense

did not ensue.

The U.S. governm ent never asked the Japane se govern -

·ment, formal ly or inform ally, for export quanti ty restra ints.

Nor

did the Japane se and U.S. indust ries mainta in incomp atible and con
tradict ory interes ts causing the two governm ents represe nting them
to clash.

On the contra ry, volunt ary quotas which the U.S. industr y

wanted Japan to implem ent were exactly the kind of solutio n the
Japane se industr y was prepare d to accept .
too, was willing

The Japane se governm ent,

to acquie se to such a settlem ent.

Nevert heless,

steel became a major source of frictio n between Japan and the United
States --large ly because of the unduly slow politic al respon se on the
part of the U.S. governm ent.

U.S. officia ls at first were not respon 

sive to domest ic industr y pressu res becaus e they were preoccu pied with
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macroeconomic issues (the curbing of inflation and expansion of U.S.
trade through the MTN) and did not fully realize the potential serious
ness of the issue from the standpoint of domestic and alliance politics.

Government inaction induced the domestic steel industry to escalate
its anti-import, anti-Japanese compaign through media exposure and
lobbying in Congress.

Thus, disagreement between government and

industry in one country can and did escalate a bilateral issue even
when the two industries and the two governments do not have mutually
contradictory interests.

This occurred because the mechanism for

protection became as important as the issue of protection itself.
Does the steel pattern apply to other U.S.-Japan trade issues?
The auto issue of 1980-81 falls somewhere between the different
patterns represented

by t~e textile wrangle and the steel issue

(Destler and Sato, 1981, pp. 12-14).

While the Japanese government

(particularly.M IT!) was prepared to make necessary adjustments, the
U.S. government remained indecisive as to an appropriate solution.
Thus, like steel, the indeciveness on the part of the U.S. government
contributed to the prolongation and escalation of the issue.

On

the

other hand, the Japanese auto industry was nowhere nearly as united
and as cooperative as the steel industry for issue resolution-
though Japanese auto makers in 1980-81 were not as intransigent· as
Japanese textile producers in 1969-71.

Since MIT! has become more

internationaliz ed and more cooperative in settling trade disputes-
in contrast to the time of the textile issue--it may well be that
in future trade disputes Japanese government willingness and indus
try reluctance, the pattern represented by the auto issue

may become
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more typical in the future.

In this repsect the steel industry is an

exception.

For the United States the steel issue was far more than one of
bilateral relations with Japan.

The European factor played an im

portant role in 1977 and again in 1980.

Apart from macroeconomic

(and legal) considerations , it would have been difficult for the
U.S. government to accept the Japanese "offer" of export restraint
As

short of a similar offer from the European Community in 1977.
. soon as massive

antidumping suits were filed against the Europeans

in fall 1977 the Carter Administration sought the new TPM approach
which clearly favored the European Community.

And no sooner had US

Steel threatened to file major antidumping complaints against the
Europeans in late 1979 (thus challenging the TPM) than the U.S. govern
ment began talks with the EC Commission and US Steel to avert a
political confrontation across the Atlantic.

All this suggests that

in the eyes of American policymakers the US-Japan relationship is more
asymmetric than the US-EC relationship, and that, ceteris paribus, the
United States continues to tend to be more sensitive to European
interests than to Japanese.

The auto issue was seen more exclusively

as a US-Japan issue since Japan was by far the most dominant foreign

supplier of automobiles in the U.S. market in 1980-81.

West Germany

was not made a target of anti-import attacks since Volkswagen had
begun prod~cing cars in the United States several years earlier.

But the European connection was not totally absent, either.

Indi

vidual European countries, notably Great Britain, France, and Italy,

.

.

had already been limiting Japanese auto imports, a fact sometimes
used by those Americans seeking protection.

And as the possibility
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of Japanese export quota restraint vis-A-vis the United States in
creased in spring 1981 the Europeans exerted pressure on Japan to
accept a similar export restraint arrangement vis-~-vis the European

Community as a whole.

In 1976 the Europeans succeeded in getting

Japanese steel makers to restrain exports to the Connnon Market, and
then the AISI filed the "301" complaint, and sought similar relief
from Japanese imports, charging that the Japanese were unfairly
diverting steel exports from Europe to the United States.

The tri

lateral relationships among the United States, Japan, and the EC
are complex and difficult.

Where any two agree on a bilateral

restraint arrangement, almost inevitably the third seeks a similar
accomodation.

This is a major weakness in the seeking of bilJteral

solutions when both partners are so large in the world economy.

..

j
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Table

Year

i.

Coste
United States and Japan: Labor and Raw Materia ls Unit
Per Ton of Steel Kill Produc ts
(Dollar s per Metric Ton)

Unit Labor Cost Basic Materia l Cost
Japan
U.S.
Japan
u.s.

2

T o t a l
Japan
U.S.

Gap)
(Japan- u.s.)

1956

54.67

26.66

56.17

93.17

110.84

119.83

8.99

1960

71.83

23.01

48.35

62.07

120.18

85.08

-35.10

1965

65.06

22.11

47.93

54.27

112.99

76.38

-36.61

1970

80.81

23.22

56.42

54.83

137.23

78.05

-59.18

1975

132.87

49.93

137.40

109.33

270.27

159.26

-111.01

1976

136.42

49.64

151.12

lU.29

287.54

161.93

-125.61

1977

148.58

60.53

146.24.

115.32

294.82

175.85

-118.97

1978

154.33

75.25

151.46

121.79

305. 79

197.04

-108.75

1979

168.21

66.10

175.62

133.80

343.83

199.90

-143.93

Sources :
has
FrC 1977 for pre-197 6. For 1977-79 , the FTC series
been updated using the same method and sources , except
as noted. Qnderly ing sources are:
States
Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on the United
and
Steel Industr y and Its Interna tional Rivals: Trends
November
Factors Determ ining Interna tional Compet itivenes s,
1977, for pre 1976. 1977-79 .
Report,
Aaerica n Iron and Steel Institu te, Annual Statist ical
various issues.
the Iron
Japan Iron and Steel Federa tion, Monthly Report of

and Steel Statist ics, various issues.

Survey
Japan Iron and Steel Federa tion, .Steel Statist ics
(Teklto Tokei Yoran), various issues.
s,
U.S. Departm ent of Coaaerc e, Survey of Current Busines
various iaaues.

capacit y
Substa ntial data problem s exist for compar isons of
rather
ive
indicat
are
figures
such
inputs;
aome
as
as well
than precise .
Annual
1the total man-hou rs for U.S. were taken from AISI, 1o'rthe
Statist ical Report. The tofal number of employe es
Steel
Japanes e steel industr y were obtaine d from JISF,
iire"calcu
Statist ics Survey. The total man-ho urs for Japan""° JISF's
lated by using monthly hours worked per worker from
The U.S. labor cost for 1976 is a FTC
Monthly Report.
total
revisio n of a project ion in FTC 1977. For U.S., the
Statist ical
Annual
AISI,
from
taken
was
hour
per
cost
"nl
~loylll
employee
and
worker
per
s
earning
monthly
Japan,
For
Report.
hourly figures
tal:en from JISF, l:Onthly Report were convert ed to
.,
ed by the steel
-For Japan, the quantit y of electri c power purchas
d from the
industr y for each of the years 1977-79 was compute
have
percent purchas ed in 1975-76 . Produce r price indexes
for labor
been used for extendi ng the FTC 1977 aeries except
coal,
coats ( ■ee note 1), and Japan iron ore, scrap, cokingFTC's
and fuel oil, where extensi ons of the series in the
coking and
sources are used. Also, include s iron ore, scrap,
gas.
rion-cok ing coal, fuel oil, electri c power and natural
cost differ
lniere has been conside rable debate on the average
Japanes e
ential; much depended on assump tions regardi ng yield,
ranged from
labor subcon tracting , and the use. The estimat es
at $65-70,
$61 (COWPS) to $120 (FTC), with Cranda ll initial ly
Kawahito
Bradfor d at $85-97, and Hueller -Kawah ito $97. See
dis
letter, Challen ge, November-December, 1978. A recent
cu■ eion appears in OTA (1980, chapter 4).

,.
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TABLE

"

JAPANESE STEELMAl(ING COSTS AND THE TRIGGER PRICE .
(As Estimated by the United States Goverment in dollars)
Labor
Other
Raw
Raw
Materials Materials

Other
Expenses

Basic

1978

Interest

Profit•

Yield
Credit

per metric
ton

TOT AL
per net
ton

TRIGGER PRICE
%
% dollars/
net ton change
change

Trigger/ Yen
Coat Gap Value
(%)
Used

Second Quarter• $113.17

63.66

73,14

26.48

21.49

21.30

22.11

(9.81)

331.54

300.76

-

300,76

-

-

240

Third Quarter

116.20

67.60

80.86

28.12

22.82

22.62

23_,42

(10.31)

351.33

318,73

6.0%

318.73

6.0%

-

226

Fourth Quarter

116.20

71.06

85.02

29.56

23.99

23. 78

24.14

(10.57)

363.12

329.42

3.4

329.42

3.4

-

215

First Quarter

116.20

81.70

97.75

33.99

27.58

27.34

26.37

(11.34)

399.59

362.51

10.0

352.53

7.0

-2.8

187

Second Quarter

119.03

72,21

94.07

28.65

29.72

25.96

25.12

(10,82)

383.94

348.31

-3 •.9

352.53

-

+1.2

197
212

1979

1980

1981

(a)\

De:,reciation

I

Third Quarter

124.68

67.10

91.08

26.62

27.62

24.12

24.82

(10. 79)

375.97

341.08

-2.1

347.54

-1.4

+1.9

Fourth Quarter

132.99

65.55

89.68

26.01

26.98

23.56

25.14

(11.05)

378.86

343.70

0.8

347.54

-

+1.1

217

First Quarter

139.23

62.66

87.19

26.75

26.58

23.10

25.27

(11.15)

379.63

344.40

0.2

358.31

3.1

+4.0

227

Fourth Qu.:\rter

161.36

77.23

92.57

32.68

36.19

26.62

29.11

(12.93)

442.83

401.73

16.6

401.73

12.1

First Quarter

161.94

77.93

93.69

33.07

36. 71

26.98

29.33

(13.02)

446.63

405.18

0.9

405.18

0,9

Second Quarter

168.08

83.77

104.13

30.47

33.99

28.66

30.92

(13.80)

466.22

422.95

4.4

422.95

4.4

-

-

°'..,I

223
221
218

Revised:-: Original cost and trigger-price was .$32~.26 per metric ton "and $297.~o:·eer.riet· ton,

Sources:
Notes:

U.S. Treas•Jry News (various issues)
U.S. Department of Commerce News (various issues)
Assumes 8% profit margin on sum of the costs of all raw materials. labor and other expenses categories, Production costs are averages for the
six major Japanese integrated steel producers.
The trigger price mechanism was suspended in the fir11t quarter of 1980, and reinstituted from the fourth quarter.

\
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Table 3 • .American

I■porta

'II

of Steel Mill Product• (Thouaands of Net Tons) (Semi-annually to coincide with TPM composition fr011 May 1978)

earlier

% of
U.S.
Apparent
Supply

Amount

% c>f
Tot:al

% Change
one year
Amount

% Change
one year
earlier

Amount

% of
Total

FROH OTHERS

FROM CANADA

FROM E.C.

FROM JAPAN

TOTAL IMPORTS

% Change
one year
earlier

Amount

% Change
% of one year
Total earlier

Amount

% of
Total

% Change
one year
earlier

May-Oct. 76

7,368

52.0

14.1

4,136

56 .. 1

71.4

1,669

22.7

2.0

632

8.6

35.8

931

12.6

277.1

Nov. 76-April 77

7,374

22.7

15.0

3,779

51.2

12.3

1,886

25.6

48.7

820

11.1

27.7

889

12.1

21.0

Hay-OCt. 77

10,868

47.5

19.1

4,108

37.8

-0.7

4,219

38.8

152.8

939

8.6

48.6

1,602

14.7

72.1

Nov. 77-April 78

11,946

62.0

21.1

4,044

33.9

7.0

4,415

37.0

134.1

1,104

9.2

34.6

2,383

19.9

168.1

May-Oct. 78

9,825

-9.6

16.7

2,773

28.2

-32.5

3,556

36.2

-15.7

1,206

12.3

28.4

2,290

23.3

42.9

Nov. 78-April 79

8,149

-31.8

14.3

2,821

34.6

-30.2

2,343

28.8

-46.9

1,141

14.0

3.4

1,844

22.6

-22.6

May-Oct. 79

9,563

-2.7

15.9

3,314

34.7

19.5

3,299

34.5

-7.2

1,224

12.8

1.5

1,726

18.0

-24.6

Nov. 79-April 80

8,496

4.3

16.1

3,449

40.6

22.3

2,194

25.8

-6.4

1,163

13.7

-5.0

1,690

19.9

-8.4

May-Oct. 80

7,477

-21.8

17.5

2,744

36.7

-17.2

2,009

26.9

-39.1

1,130

15.1

-2.8

1,594

21.3

-7.6

Sources:

American Iron & Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report, various issues.

American Iron & Steel Institute, Selected Steel Industry Data (monthly), various issues.

...,I
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Table 4.

American Steel Price Increases (Annual rate,%)

Steel
Mill
General
-Producer Products
Price (Producer
Price)
Index
11.5
4.6
6.2
7.8
, 12.6
·- -14.0

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
· 19so

May-Oct. 75
Nov. 75-April
May-Oct. 76
Nov. 76-April
May-Oct. 77
Nov. 77-April
May-Oct. 78
Nov. 78-April
May-Oct: 79
Nov. 79-April
May-Oct. 80
lJn•n-

A'I-Y •

76
77
78
79
80

7.9
2.7
7.3
6.9
6.0'
6.8
8.7
14 .5
13.2
9.0
9.6

Yen
Carbon
AppreciSteel
Products ation
Import (Trigger
Price)
Prices

Japan Average Export
Price of Steel to U.S.
Ainount

% Increase

$ 357.52

1.9
-17.5
3.4
14.5
21.3
13.6

16.0
6.3
9.6
10.7
10.2
8.0a

Trigger
Price a
Index

23.0
1.6
13.1

315.96
352.12
460.21
506.51
575.18c

-11.6
11.4
30.7
10.1
14.8c

455.99
503.95
502.31
520.37
596. 72

21.0
-0.1
7.2
29.3

2.8
8.3

13.8
7.2
11. 7
12.9
7.3
9.8
9.8
10.9
2.2

I

9.7
-0.3
-2.5
11.9
31.4
35.0
-6.3
22.0
1.1

80-:t,1".ay 81

20.8
16. 7
-20.3
-18.4b
1.8b
4.5

19.1
14.0
-2.8
6.2
24.2
10.6

Notes:
a: Second-four th quarterly comparison at annual rate.
b: Comparison with first quarter 1980.

c: Through November (annual rate).
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor.
AISI.
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